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RATTLING THE CAGE DEFENDED
STEVEN M. WISE*
Abstract: In Rattling the Cage: Toward Levi Rights for Animals, the author
advocated basic legal rights—specifically common law rights—for
chimpanzees, bonobos, and other nonhuman animals. In this Article,
the author responds to many of the major criticisms of Rattling the Cage.
The author confronts critics of his historical arguments for legal rights
for nonhuman animals, tracing those arguments through ancient
philosophy and nineteenth century English statutes. The author also
expands upon his legal arguments for animal rights, reexamining
various theories of rights and justifications for treating animals as
property, Finally, borrowing from his upcoming book Drawing the Line:
Science and The Case for Animal Rights, the author defends his advocacy of
legal rights for nonhuman animals based on the relative autonomy
nonhuman animals possess.
INTRODUCTION
"The 'animal rights' movement is gathering steam and Steven
Wise is one of the pistons."l Thus Judge Richard Posner began a Yale
Law Journal review of my book, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for
Animals, published in 2000. 2 The animal rights movement—in its
technical sense—is gathering steam. In the mid-1980s Pace University
School of Law invited attorney Jolene Marion to teach the first animal
law class offered at any American law school. In 1990, I began teach-
ing "Animal Rights Law" at Vermont Law School. By 2002, nearly
twenty-five American law schools' had offered, were offering, or were
about to offer a course or seminar in animal rights law, including
those at Harvard, Yale, Georgetown, UCLA, Boston College, Duke,
* Steven M. Wise is president of The Center for the Expansion of Fundamental Rights,
Inc., and has taught "Animal Rights Law" at the Harvard, Vermont, and John Marshall Law
Schools, and in the master's program in Animals and Public Policy at the Tufts University
School of Veterinary Medicine. He is the author of RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL
RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000) and DitAwiNG THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL
RIGHTS (2002). He thanks the Glaser Family Foundation for its support, which allowed
him to write this Article.
1 Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE U. 527, 527 (2000) (book review).
It Id. See generally STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR
ANIMALS (2000).
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Hastings, Northwestern, and the University of Michigan. In Europe,
animal law courses are being, or have been, taught at the University of
Aberdeen, University of East Anglia, John Moore's University in Liv-
erpool, Westminster University, the University of Utrecht, and the
University of Vienna. In 2001, American television personality and
animal rights activist, Bob Barker, established the Bob Barker En-
dowment Fund for the Study of Animal Rights at Harvard Law School.
In 1995, the first legal journal devoted to animal law appeared. Animal
Law is published by the students of the Northwestern School of Law
of Lewis and Clark College in Oregon—the law school that published
the first environmental law journal more than a quarter century ago.
In 2002, a second journal, the Journal of Animal Law and Policy, is
scheduled to be published jointly by students from Harvard, Yale,
Boston College and New York University Law Schools.
If I am a piston, it is because Rattling the Cage is the first book to
advocate basic legal—as opposed to moral—specifically common law
rights for chimpanzees and bonobos, or for that matter, any nonhu-
man animals It attracted attention from judges, lawyers, scientists,
and environmentalists around the world. The critiques were not uni-
form. In the Harvard Law Review, philosopher Martha Nussbaum con-
cluded the book "makes an important contribution to progress on
one of the most urgent moral issues of our time. "4 Pharmacology and
neuroscience professor Robert Speth declared, "No matter how many
imaginary scenarios he devises, no matter how defamatory his charac-
terization of biomedical research, no matter how provocative his
analogies, no matter how intensely he attacks religion, he cannot re-
verse the simple, fundamental fact that apes are not humans."5 In this
Article I respond to the most important criticisms.
I. CRITICISMS OF MY HISTORY
Judge Posner found history "rather to one side of Wise's project
and might be regarded indeed as little more than padding; it does no
work in the book."6 For reasons set forth by Justice Holmes, I dis-
agree:
3 I did not argue, as some critics imply, that any nonhuman animal is entitled to con-
stitutional rights. See, e.g., Posner, supra note I, at 531, 538-39.
4 Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need fora Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1506,1548-49 (2001) (book review).
5 Robert C. Speth, Review of Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals, in J.
SOO( FOR VETERINARY MED. ETHICS, May 2000, at 6, 7.
6 Posner, supra note 1, at 529.
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The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of
history. History must be a part of the study, because without
it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our
business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it
is the first step toward an enlightened sceptisism, that is, to-
ward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those
rules. . . . It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid clown in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.'
The thrust of Rattling the Cage's intellectual and legal history is that
the rule that every nonhuman animal is a legal thing is an anachro-
nism. Its roots burrow deeply into Roman law and the ancient phi-
losophies and religions from which that law sprung. That is why it is
important to reply to Professor Nussbaum's criticisms of my history as
"incomplete," "unilinear," and "failing to describe the complexity of
ancient philosophical thinking," including the thinking of Pythagore-
ans and Neoplatonists.8 "[O]n Wise's account," Professor Nussbaum
writes,
there is absolutely nothing in our ancient Greek and Roman
heritage that might have informed ethical thought in a posi-
tive direction with regard to thought about animals. All an-
cient philosophers, and presumably the lay people
influenced by them, were morally obtuse on this matter.
Progress had to await our more enlightened era.9
According to Professor Nussbaum, the picture I paint of history is that
[w]e were all obtuse under the influence of bad Aristotle
and the Stoics, and then, after a long time, things got much
better under the influence of Charles Darwin. Now we are
all Darwinians, ready to understand our commonality with
animals when it is clearly shown to us by evidence. The most
difficult question is how law, that very conservative and
7 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
8 Martha C. Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1513-14, 1522, 1526.
9 Id. at 1514.
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precedent-driven discipline, can be made to listen to the new
knowledge we have acquired.'°
But an American Bar Association Journal review noted that Rattling
the Cage was
ambitious in its effort to summarize entire fields of human
knowledge. They include: a historical view of man's concept
of his position in the natural order, the worldwide legal his-
tory of animals dating from pre-biblical times, the genesis of
civil liberties, and the evolution of common law. Wise also
includes the modern legal history of . . . the slave, the
definition of consciousness, the genetic composition of hu-
mans and chimpanzees, and the intricacies of primate be-
havior. 11
The key word in that review is "summarize." Rattling the Cage, limited
to about 250 pages, could not provide a thick, rich, unbroken history
of how the West has viewed nonhuman animals from ancient times.
That would have taken an entire book, or three. Richard Sorabji, a
professor of ancient philosophy, upon whom I relied, took nearly an
entire book just to illuminate the competing Greek philosophical
theories about nonhuman animal minds and how this affected their
moral status in ancient times: 12
Rattling the Cage was intended to accomplish something else: fol-
low the main intellectual thread that leads from today's legal thing-
hood of nonhuman animals through the maze of legal history to its
origins in Greek and Roman philosophy and in Hebrew and Roman
law. The stories are complex, with casts of hundreds, and sweep across
four thousand years. I could devote only about forty pages to it. In the
story of Theseus and the minotaur, the hero makes his way through
Daedalus' maze, from which no one ever escaped, seeking the mon-
ster to slay, while playing out the thread necessary to find his way out.
If Theseus had been asked how he did it, his questioners would have
been most interested in knowing where the thread led and not every
blind alley he encountered. Similarly, Rattling the Cage tells the reader
10 Id. at 1526.
u Lisa Stansky, Penonlwod for Bonzo? Animal Rights Lawyer Argues for Protections for Higher
Primates, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2000, at 94.
" See generally RICHARD SORALUL ANIMAL MINDS AND HUMAN MORALS (1993); WISE,
supra note 2, at 272-75.
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where the thread of the legal thinghood of nonhuman animals began
and has led.13
Professor Sorabji notes that "the Stoic view of animals, with its
stress on their irrationality, became embedded in Western, Latin-
speaking Christianity above all through Augustine. Western Christian-
ity concentrated on one-half, the anti-animal half, of the much more
evenly balanced ancient debate." 14 Professor Nussbaum concedes that
much of ancient philosophical thinking about nonhuman animals was
based upon the belief that souls migrated between human and non-
human animals, but this idea "had little impact on the thinking of
philosophers" and no impact on modern law. 15 A respected Aristote-
lian scholar, she is exercised by my allegedly crediting Aristotle "with
all the evils of two thousand years of moral obtuseness." 16 She finds,
for example, "no evidence that he believed in a universal teleology of
nature, such as the 'Great Chain of Being." 17 I respectfully disagree.
The Great Chain of Being was, in the words of its foremost
scholar, Professor Arthur 0. Lovejoy, the "conception of the plan and
structure of the world which, through the Middle Ages and down to
the late eighteenth century, many philosophers, most men of science,
and, indeed, most educated men, were to accept without question." 19
It was "one of the half-dozen most potent and persistent presupposi-
tions in Western thought. It was, in fact, until not much more than a
century ago, probably the most widely familiar conception of the gen-
eral scheme of things, of the constitutive pattern of the universe." 19
Professor Lovejoy said it was Aristotle "who chiefly suggested to natu-
ralists and philosophers of later times the idea of arranging (at least)
all animals in a single graded scala naturae according to their degree
of 'perfection.""$°
Those who fought for the first anti-cruelty statutes in England in
the early nineteenth century accepted the Great Chain of Being. To
15 Even Professor Nussbaum understands how limitations of space can force an author
to condense and omit. See Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1523 n.80 (Bentham "was, however,
preceded by Montaigne and Mandeville, whose contributions I have simply omitted here;
less systematic than Bentham's, they were, nonetheless important."). Id. at 1526 ("a real
look at history (toward which I have made only a few gestures)").
14 SORMIJI, supra note 12, at 2.
15 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1526-27. ,
16 /d. at 1516.
" Id. at 1517.
15 ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN. OF BEING 59 (1960) .
19 Id.
20 1d. at 58.
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what else was Chief Justice Taney referring in the infamous Dred Scott
case when he wrote that, at the time of the ratification of the United
States Constitution, blacks were seen as "beings of an inferior order"
and "so far inferior [to whites], that they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect."21
What Nussbaum calls "universal teleology," others, such as the
evolutionary biologist, Ernst Mayr, call "cosmic teleology"; both con-
vey the idea that everything in nature has a purpose. Six years ago I
wrote:
Some modern students of Aristotle claim that he has long
been mischaracterized as a universal or cosmic teleolo-
gist.... Even those 'who contend that Aristotle has been tra-
ditionally, but badly, misunderstood as a cosmic teleologist
... concede that, if the traditionalists were led astray, it was
Aristotle's hand that pointed the wrong way. These untradi-
tional interpretations do not detract from the truth that,
misunderstood or no, Aristotle was, until recently, nearly
uniformly understood to be a cosmic teleologist and that it
was these traditional understandings that affected the forma-
tion of the law of nonhuman animals. 22
Not every Greek thought alike, but they did think in ways that failed
to respect nonhuman animals, or so we believe.
Professor Nussbaum concedes that Aristotle, in his Politics (as I
reported), said that all nonhuman animals were created for the sake
of humans, but insists this is "counterbalanced by hundreds of state-
ments in his biological writings suggesting that each animal's goal is
its own life and flourishing."23 I do not know whether Aristotle was
actually a cosmic or universal teleologist, or a builder of the Great
Chain of Being, or an advocate of the natural inferiority of nonhu-
man animals (and women and slaves, as he says in his Politics). But
until recently, few doubted he was all these things and it was these
ideas, combined with the allied ideas of Stoics and the Old Testament,
and not the ideas of the Pythagoreans or the Neoplatonists or other
21 Scotty Sandford, 60 U.S., (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
22 Steven M. Wise, How Nonhuman Animals Were Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, 1
ANIMAL L. 15, 22 n.33 (1995) (citing D.M. BALME, ARISTOTLE'S DE PARTIBUS ANIMALIUM I
AND DE GENERATIONE ANIMALIUM 1 93-98 (1972); ERNST MAYR, TOWARD A NEW PHILOSO-
PHY OP BIOLOGY 60-61 (1988); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, ARISTOTLE'S DE MOTU ANIMALIUM
60 (1978)).
"Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1517, 1519.
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omp.0 au% fly fl•a(l-cotl philosophers. that mere incorporated into
eJth t.lnistimi thinking about nonhuman animals, aggressively advo-
t aicel by St. Augustine, absorbed wholesale into Roman law, most no-
tably Gains* Institutes, Justinian's Institutes, Justinian's Digest, and finally
pressed into the common law. 24
The classics scholar, Peter Birks, wrote:
Honore has shown that Gaius brought to his law a mind
formed by Aristotelian thought and methods. Aristotle, dis-
cussing the acquisition of property, also creates a hierarchy
of natural provision which, not very differently from Genesis,
comes to an apex in man. Furthermore, his discussion in-
cludes one sentence which is almost exactly Gaius' assertion
that, ..."(ilf then nature makes nothing without a purpose,
nothing with no end to serve, it follows by necessity that na-
ture has made all things for man."25
If Gaius attended an appellate argument in an animal law case today,
he would have no trouble following it, for the Anglo-American com-
mon law of nonhuman animals remains essentially Roman." Profes-
sor Nussbaum's argument catches the same snag as do the arguments
of those who argue that Abraham Lincoln or Thomas Jefferson fa-
vored slavery. Statements may exist from which one might infer that
truth; nonetheless the Emancipation Proclamation, the Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Declaration of
Independence remain.
Professor Nussbaum agrees I was "basically right about the Sto-
ics.... As Wise says . . . the Stoics did deny reason to animals, and
thence all serious ethical concern."27 But she complains I ignored
Descartes, especially his notorious remarks about animals as mere
As to Aristotle, see JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE—ECOLOGI-
CAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS 13-14 (1974); HOLMES ROLSTON, III, ENVIRON-
MENTAL ETHICS—DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN THE NATURAL WORLD 45 (1988); WISE, MOM
note 2, at 17-34; Wise, supra note 22, at 21-34. For the process that led to Aristotelean and
Stoic ideas to be taken into first Roman, then the common law, see Steven M. Wise, The
Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 471, 997-505, 516-21,
525-38 (1996); see also G. INST. 1.53.
" Peter Birks, An Unacceptable Face of Human Property, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN THE
ROMAN LAW OF PROPERTY 61, 65 (Peter Birks ed., 1989) (translated by editor from Creek)
(quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1256n20); see also A.M. HONORt, GAIUS 96-116 (1962).
" Wise, supra note 24, at 537-38.
v Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1519. Nussbaum also writes, "Wise does not acknowledge
that the Stoics are the great moral egalitarians of the ancient world . . . ." Id. at 1520. But 1
did. SeeWist, supra note 2, at 14, 33.
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automata."28 I ignored Descartes' remark because, by the time he
made it, the legal thinghood of nonhuman animals had been fixed
for centuries. Descartes did not significantly affect the law of nonhu-
man animals.
Nussbaum also criticizes my alleged leap from Descartes to Dar-
win, "as if it took the discovery of evolutionary theory to get our
moral consciousness going and to prompt legal change." 29 This de-
pends upon what sort of legal change we are discussing. Nussbaum
writes that "(13]y the time Darwin published The Origin of Species, an
animal rights movement, in both ethics and law, was in full swing in
Europe," and that "[s]ignificant animal rights legislation was passed
(in the UK) in 1822."° Here, she confuses animal rights with animal
welfare and animal cruelty legislation.
There was no "animal rights movement" in law in the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and even most of the twentieth centuries. There is a nas-
cent one today, but nonhuman animals lack legal rights today just as
they did when Lord Erskine, former Lord Chancellor of England,
spoke on the floor of the House of Lords in 1809: "Animals are con-
sidered as property only: to destroy or to abuse them, from malice to
the proprietor, or with an intention injurious to his interest in them,
is criminal; but the animals themselves are without protection; the law
regards them not substantively; they have no rights." 31 Under the
influence of the Great Chain of Being, Lord Erskine did not seek le-
gal rights for nonhuman animals. 52 Instead, he wanted to make it a
misdemeanor to wound maliciously or, with wanton cruelty, to beat or
otherwise abuse "every animal which comes in contact with man, and
whose powers, and qualities, and instincts, are obviously constructed
for his use. . ."38 These animals were, he declared, "created ... for
our use, but not for our abuse." 34 With the statute's enactment he in-
tended to "consecrate, perhaps, in all nations, and in all ages, that just
and eternal principle which binds the whole world in one harmoni-
ous chain, under the dominion of enlightened man, the lord and
governor of all."88
22 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1522.
22 Id.
30 Id. at 1523.
31 14 PARL. DEB, (1St ser.) (1809) 554.
32 See id. at 556-58.
33 Id. at 555; see also id. at 557.
s+ Id. at 555.
35 Id. at 557.
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The UK legislation of 1822, formally entitled "An Act to prevent
the cruel and improper Treatment of Cattle," known as "Martin's
Act," gave no rights to nonhuman animals. 36 It merely extended some
small protection under the criminal law to a handful of domesticated
nonhuman animals—cattle, oxen, horses, and sheep—punishable, at
worst, by fine." Martin's Act was an anti-cruelty statute, not a rights
statute, nor even a welfare statute." Professor Mike Radford notes,
To cause an animal to suffer unnecessarily, or to subject it to
any other treatment which amounts to an offence of cruelty,
is self-evidently detrimental , to its welfare. To that extent,
there is a degree of affinity between cruelty and welfare, but
the two are far from being synonymous: prejudicing an ani-
mal's welfare does not of itself amount in law to cruelty."
Speaking of Martin's Act and the entire body of legislation in the area
of nonhuman animal welfare over the next century, Professor Rad-
ford explains that "while this legislation imposed restrictions on how
animals could be treated, none of it—nor, indeed, any enacted subse-
quently—changed the traditional legal status accorded to animals by
the courts. "40 As Lord Erskine noted, that status was property.41
II. CRITICISMS OF MY LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A. Knowledge of the Complex Cognitive Abilities of Nonhuman
Animals Is Not New
In Rattling the Cage, I argued the ancient Greeks who most
influenced the development of modern nonhuman animal law were
Aristotle and the Stoics. 42 They came close to believing that not even
the most cognitively sophisticated nonhuman animals could reason,
think, or believe.° Indeed, the Stoics denied them the abilities to per-
ceive, conceive, remember, and experience, or know anything of the
93 MIKE RADFORD, ANIMAL WELFARE LAW IN BRITAIN-REGULATION AND RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 39 (2001).
37 Id. at 33-40..
28 See id. at 39.
39 Id. at 261.
40 Id. at 99.
41
 RADFORD, supra note 36, at 101-02.
42 See WISE, supra note 2, at 14-17.
43 Id. at 15.
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past or future.° I spent three chapters demonstrating how modern
science has illuminated the extraordinarily complex minds of chim-
panzees and bonobos.°
Attacks on this description of chimpanzee and bonobo cognition
descended from opposite sides: some critics contended that chimpan-
zees and bonobos lack complex cognition, while others complained
that we have known that nonhuman animals are cognitively complex
for a very long time. In Commentary, journalist Damon Linker wrote:
I will leave it to others to judge the significance of the fact
that a handful of bonobos, after years of intense training by
scientists, have apparently managed to "understand" "thou-
sands" of words; to assess whether the "theory of mind" sup-
posedly possessed by chimpanzees really deserves to be de-
scribed in the same terms we use to talk about the
philosophical writings of Descartes and Hegel; and to evalu-
ate the appropriateness of attributing "self-awareness," "con-
sciousness," and a "sense of self" to creatures who, lacking
language, are utterly incapable of conceiving of such abstrac-
tions.°
I wrote "[t]he last redoubt in the fight against animal consciousness is
th [e] syllogism: Language is necessary for consciousness; only hu-
mans have language; therefore only humans are conscious." 47 But
language is obviously unnecessary for consciousness, even for much
higher-level cognition, as anyone with a two-year-old can attest, and
chimpanzees and bonobos, who demonstrate complex mental abili-
ties, can learn a human proto-language, complete with simple syntax
without intensive training.°
Neurologist Antonio Damasio has written that, when young, he
was frequently told language produced consciousness.° "The answer
sounded too easy, far too simple for something which I then imagined
unconquerably complex, and also quite implausible, given what I saw
" Id. at 14-16.
45 See generally id. at 119-237.
46 Damon Linker, Reply to Letters from Readers, quoted in COMMENT., Jul.—Aug. 2001, at 8.
47 Wise, supra note 2, at 158.
48 See id. at 158-62,194-237. In my upcoming book, I show that gorillas, orangutans,
Atlantic bottle-nosed dolphins, and African grey parrots have also learned a human proto-
language, complete with a proto-syntax. STEVEN WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND
THE CASE FOR ANIMAL Ricurrs (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 87-108,135-50,199—
202,207-20, on file with author).
ANTONIO R DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS 107 (1999).
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when I went to the zoo. I never believed it and I am glad I did not. "50
In his extensive work with the neurologically impaired, Damasio has
discerned no link between language and at least simpler forms of
consciousness.51
The editors of Nature Neuroscience, who oppose legal rights for
chimpanzees and bonobos, agree "it is clear that their cognitive ca-
pacities exceed those of many humans." 52 Michael Hutchins, Director
of Conservation and Science of the American Zoo and Aquarium As-
sociation, and no supporter of ape rights, concedes "some nonhuman
animals think and have einotions."55 Judge Posner wrote "obviously
animals are conscious in the sense that distinguishes being conscious
from being unconscious."54 Professor Nussbaum is convinced that
chimpanzees and bonobos "have a wide range of cognitive and emo-
tional capacities, roughly at the level of a three-year-old child. " 55
Linker ignores how Professor Sue Savage-Rumbaugh educates
the bonobos with whom she works at Georgia State University. She
assembles a learning environment in which the bonobos learn as
naturally, and in much the same way, as does a human child. 58 More
seriously, Linker confuses consciousness, self-awareness, and the sense
of self, all of which chimpanzees have, with an ability to conceive what
those things mean. Because I cannot explain what James Joyce was
saying in Finnegan's Wake does not mean I cannot read what he
wrote.57
Professor Richard Epstein challenges my claim from the opposite
direction, writing that ancient law did not ignore the obvious point
that animals are capable of having mental states. 58 One rule provided
that "an animal that left its owner's home with an intention to return
[the so-called animus revertendi] could not be taken by another, while
the animal that had regained its freedom in the wild could be so cap-
6° Id.
51 See id. at 108-12.
t. Editorial, Legal Challenges to Animal Experimentation, 3 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 523,
523 (2000).
" Michael Hutchins, Book Review, 61(4) ANIMAL BEHAV, 855, 856 (2001) (reviewing
STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000)).
H Posner, supra note 1, at 529. He erred however in thinking that when I refer to con-
sciousness, I mean self-consciousness. See id.; WISE, supra note 2, at 128-29.
"Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1533.
"WISE, supra note 2, at 222-24,
57 See generally id. at 119-236.
" Richard A. Epstein, 77te Dangerous Claims of the Animal Rights Movement, in 10(2) THE
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 28, 30 (2000).
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tured."59 Another rule "understood that animals can be provoked or
teased, that they are capable of committing deliberate or inadvertent
acts."60 This rule would reduce the liability of an owner for an animal
that attacked when provoked 61
But what mental complexity did animae revertendi actually re-
quire? The rule speaks primarily in terms of "instinct" and "habit."62
Gaius' Institutes, the main classical text on the occupancy of wild non-
human animals, referred to wild nonhuman animals "habituated to
go away and return ... only the cessation of the instinct of returning
is the termination of ownership ... the instinct of returning is held to
be lost when the habit of returning is discontinued."6S With respect to
animae revertendi, Justinian's Institutes reads, "they are considered yours
as long as they have the intention of returning, but if they cease to
have this intention, they cease to be yours. . . . These animals are sup-
posed to have lost the intention, when they have lost the habit of re-
turning. "64
Instinctive behavior is generally performed "without conscious
design or intentional adaptation of means to ends," while "habit" is "a
settled disposition or tendency to act in a certain way, especially] one
acquired by frequent repetition of the same act until it becomes al-
most or quite involuntary."63 Because habitual conduct tends to be
"semiautomatic," it may sometimes be probative of human conduct. 66
The habits of nonhuman animals are more generally admissible, pre-
59 Id.
00 Id. at 32.
61 See id. Epstein may similarly overstate what mental complexities are generally ac-
cepted within the scientific community even today: nonhuman animals, he writes,
have extensive powers of anticipation and rationalization; they can form and
break alliances; they can show anger, annoyance, and remorse ... they can
engage in acts of rape and acts of love; they respect and violate territories. In-
deed, in many ways their repertoire of emotions is quite broad, rivaling that
of human beings ....
Id. at 32.
62 See, e.g., G. INST. 2.68; J. INST. 2.1.15 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans.).
63 G. INsT.supra note 62, at 2.68.
64 1 INST., supra note 62, at 2.1.15.
65 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1044 (2d ed. 1989); 6 id. at 993.
66 PAUL J. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE, § 4.4.9, at 170 (6th ed.
1994). McCormick, however, criticizes characterizing the difference between habit and
character as "between Pavlov and Freud," overstates the point, admonishing that "[ti he
doing of the habitual act may become semiautomatic." 1 MeConantoic ON EVIDENCE, § 195,
at 825-26, 825 n.4 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992), (quoting 22 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5233 (1978)).
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sumably because nonhuman animals are believed to act more auto-
matically."
If an owner were entitled to reduction of liability for damage
caused by a provoked nonhuman animal, Roman law was clear that
the animal could never be guilty of any legal wrongdoing, for Romans
believed that every nonhuman animal lacked reason or sense. 68 At
best, provocation derived from emotion, not intellect. Ulpian, for ex-
ample, is quoted in Justinian's Digest discussing an action that lies
when "a quadruped does harm because its wildness is stirred." 69 It was
accepted that nonhuman animals could act emotionally, they could be
provoked or act aggressively or ferociously. But this does not necessar-
ily imply they possessed other mental states, and certainly not reason.
B. Neither Nonhuman Animals Nor Human Slaves Were
Simply Treated as Property
Professor Epstein also takes me to task for claiming that histori-
cally nonhuman animals
were treated as property, as mere things. But that assertion
massively oversimplifies a difficult area of law, and is no more
accurate than the common proposition that slaves were
treated as things. . . . [F]rom the earliest times slaves were
governed by a set of rules that treated them as legal hybrids,
part property and part human beings,"
while animals, for their part, were treated both as living organisms
and private property.
Professor Epstein is correct that the assertion that nonhuman
animals were treated as property is no more accurate than the com-
mon proposition that slaves were treated as things. Nonhuman ani-
mals were treated as property. Slaves were treated as things. It is no
more contradictory to be considered part property and part human
being than it is to be considered both part Italian and part human
being. As the institution of slavery evinces, one can be both human
and property. Similarly, it is no contradiction for a nonhuman animal
L1ACOS, supra note 66, § 4.4.9, at 174.
68 DIG. 9.1.1.3 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18) (Alan Watson trans.).
69 Id. at 1.1.9; see also id. at 9.1.1.8, 11;1 INST., supra note 62, at 4.9 (nonhuman ani-
mals are devoid of reason and "cannot be said to have a wrong intent"; irrational animals
can harm "through wantonness, rage, or ferocity").
" Epstein, supra note 58, at 30.
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to be considered a living organism and private property. One can be
both a living organism and private property.
"Things either fall within the sphere of private ownership or they
do not.'11 In civil law, nonhuman animals have generally been treated
as things, with enormous consequences. I began Rattling the Cage by
recalling the brutish life and lingering death of Jerom, a chimpanzee
whom biomedical researchers imprisoned for life inside a small, dim,
often chilly cell that lay within a large windowless grey concrete box at
the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia." As
a toddler he was repeatedly infected with various strains of HIV." Af-
ter a hellish decade, he died. 74 In a February, 2000 speech in Boston's
Faneuil Hall, professor Laurence Tribe said, "Clearly, Jerom was en-
slaved. "75
Enslaved beings of every species are generally treated as legal
things. The first definition of "slave" in the Oxford English Dictionary is
"[o]ne who is the property of, and entirely subject to, another person,
whether by capture, purchase, or birth; a servant completely divested
of freedom and personal rights." 76 International law has, for most of a
century, defined slavery as "the status or condition of a person over
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are
exercised."'" According to Professor Robert Shaw, "[u]nder Roman
law, slaves were treated clearly as things, possessing no rights whatso-
ever."76
 Wrote Professor Thomas Collett Sanders, "a slave had no
rights."79
 "[Elven before the XVIIIth Dynasty in Egypt," Professor
David Brion Davis wrote, "the slave was legally defined as a thing; and
the same conception prevailed in Babylonia, Assyria, Greece, Rome,
India, China, and parts of medieval Europe." 80
71 Birks, supra note 25, at 61.
72 WISE, supra note 2, at 1-2.
" Id. at 1.
74 Id. at 2.
" Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us About the
Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Wm* of Steven M. Wise, 7 Arrnua. L. 1, 4 (2001).
76 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at 665.
"Slavery Convention, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, Article 1 (1926).
78 ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 158 (1991).
78 Thomas C. Sandars, Introduction to THE INsTrrirrEs OF JUSTINIAN 27 (Bernard D.
Reams ed., Thomas C. Sandars trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1984) (1876).
60
 DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 32 (1966); see
Jarman v. Patterson, 23 Ky. 644, 644 (1828), available at 1828 WL 1332, at *3 (Ky. 1828)
("[Al slave by our code is not treated as a person ... but a thing, as he stood in the civil
code of the Roman Empire.").
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Scholars often compare the rightlessness of human slaves to that
of nonhuman animals under ancient law. "The truly striking fact"
about slavery, Professor Davis wrote,
is the antiquity and almost universal acceptance of the con-
cept of the slave as a human being who is legally owned, used,
sold, or otherwise disposed of as if he or she were a domestic
animal. This parallel persisted in the similarity of naming,
branding, and even pricing slaves according to their equiva-
lent in cows, horses, camels, pigs, and chickens. 81
According to Professor Patrick Mac Chombaich de Colquhoun, in
Roman law, lc] orporeal things are either moveables or immoveables.
Res mobiles are of two kinds,—those capable of innate motion, res sere
moventes, as animals or slaves . ..."82 Dean Roscoe Pound noted that,
in Rome a slave "was a thing, and as such, like animals, could be the
object of rights of property."85 Professor Barry Nicholas wrote that, in
Roman law, "the slave was a thing. Being endowed with reason and
often indeed well-educated, he was inevitably a peculiar thing and
could, for example, acquire rights for his master. But he himself had
no rights: he was merely an object of rights, like an animal."84 Accord-
ing to Professor Nicholas, Rome's initial regulation of the treatment
of slaves "took the same form as. our legislation for the protection of
animals. The master might be punished criminally for abuse of his
powers, but the slave could not himself invoke the protection of the
law."85 Professor Peter Birks said that in Rome, "unless and until they
were manumitted the same law applied to them as to the ox and the
ass."86
Judge Posner speculates that:
[I]f pressed, Wise would admit that the only right of most,
maybe all, species would be the right not to be gratuitously
tortured, wounded, or killed—and as it happens, those were,
81
 DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS 13 (1984).
as 2 PAnucts. MAC CHOMI3AICH DE COLQUHOUN, ROMAN CIVIL LAW 13 (1851).
as 4 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 192 (1959) (internal quotations omitted).
81 BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 69 (3d ed. 1962); see W.W.
BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 37 (2d ed. 1939); 3 E.C. CLARK, HISTORY
OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 61 (1990) (for almost the entire period of Roman law, the slave
was little more than a mere chattel").
88 NICHOLAS, supra note 84, at 69; see JOHN CHIPMAN CRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES
OF THE LAW 43 (2d ed. 1931).
a° Birks, supra note 25, at 61.
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at least nominally (an important qualification), the rights of
Negro slaves in the antebellum South. And yet we think the
essence of slavery is to be without rights. To be told now that
slaves had rights is an example of how the movement for
animal rights can depreciate human rights. 87
As described above, most scholars routinely deny that human slaves
had any legal rights." The essence of slavery is rightlessness. A stray
scholar may argue to the contrary. Professor Robert Shaw wrote that
in the antebellum South, "[w]hile it came to be accepted, for most
purposes and in most jurisdictions, that the slave was a person, enti-
tled to the protection of the law and against whom crimes could be
committed, it was commonplace that vicious assaults upon slaves, or
even murder, were treated as trespasses only, offenses against the
owners, with remedies to be sought only by civil suits."89
 But these
statements cannot be taken literally, for they almost always mean that
criminal statutes, akin to the anti-cruelty laws enacted to protect non-
human animals, merely protected human slaves from the arbitrary or
unnecessary infliction of excessive force."
I would not admit "the only right of most, maybe all, species
would be the right not to be gratuitously tortured, wounded, or
killed."91
 That would contradict the central claim of Rattling the Cage,
which is that at least chimpanzees and bonobos are entitled to the ba-
87 Posner, supra note 1, at 538.
38
 As did judges. See, e.g., Peter v. Hargrave, 45 Va. 95,95 (Grail) 12 (1848), available at
1848 WL 2754, at *2 (Va. 1848) (slaves have no personal rights"). In the American South,
slaves could sue for their freedom based on a claim that they shouldn't be slaves. SHAW,
Supra note 78, at 110.
Freedom suits existed not as a means for blacks to alter their legal status from
slave to free, but as a recourse for those who were in fact free, and who thus
possessed a remedy for illegal enslavement. De jure, those enslaved illegally
were not slaves at all, but free persons wrongly deprived of their legal rights.
Thus, a claimant's right to petition the court was not predicated on the as-
sumption that a slave had any legal rights, but instead on her rights as a pre-
sumptively free person illegally held in slavery.
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, "Yearning to Breath &ee": Legal Bar-
riers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213,
1234-35 (1993).
SHAW, supra note 78, at 160; see id. at 158 ("[I]t was invariably accepted that slaves
did possess a right to life and limb.").
9° I discuss, infra, at 52-59, whether this gave slaves or nonhuman animals any legal
rights.
91
 Posner, supra note 1, at 538.
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sic rights of bodily integrity and bodily liberty.° By bodily integrity, I
mean a general immunity from unconsented-to touchings, akin to
what the United States Supreme Court has referred to as "the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference by others, unless by clear and un-
questionable authority of law . . . ' Mlle right . . . to be let alone.' "9s
The gratuitousness of the violation would be as relevant for nonhu-
mans as it is for humans. By bodily liberty, I mean the freedom to
move about unless one is a danger to oneself or others, which would
certainly be the case for chimpanzees or bonobos in the United
States, but would certainly not be the case, say, for Atlantic bottle-
nosed dolphins living along America's. East and Gulf Coasts. Even
chimpanzees and bonobos in America could be placed in sanctuaries
in which they would have some reasonable degree of bodily liberty.
In Rattling the Cage, I also said "I never meant to imply that these
two dignity-rights are the only legal rights to which [chimpanzees and
bonobos] might be entitled. Should they, for example, have the legal
rights to reproduce, to keep their offspring, or to have sufficient and
proper habitat?"94 I wrote that philosopher Isaiah Berlin said that
The question of whether humans should have fundamental
rights must be answered . . . by invoking the myriad, multi-
faceted, and complex ways in which we "determine good and
evil, that is to say, on our moral, religious, intellectual, eco-
nomic, and aesthetic values." What rights should we have is
"bound up with our conception of man, and of the basic
demands of his nature." The question of whether animals
should have fundamental legal rights should be answered in
a similar way, similarly bound up with our conceptions of
who they are, the demands of their natures, and how we de-
termine good and evil. 95
We must recognize that the natures of other animals may be radically
different from ours and that the greater our evolutionary distance,
the greater may be our differences, and the greater may also be our
difficulty in understanding the demands of their natures.
92 WISE, supra note 2, at 239-66.
92 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), (quoting COOLEY ON
TORTS 29).
94 WISE, supra note 2, at 267.
" Id, at 66-67, (quoting Isaiah Berlin,' Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIB-
ERTY 118, 169 (1969)).
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C. Line-Drawing Problems
I. The Criticisms
Several commentators complained that, while I criticize the
common law for drawing an arbitrary line that excludes every non-
human animal from eligibility for legal rights, I ignore serious line-
drawing problems of my own. If one breaks through the legal wall that
separates humans from every other animal, the argument goes, there
can be no reasonable stopping place, either with respect to the non-
human animals who would be entitled to rights or the rights to which
they would be entitled.
The science journal, Nature Neuroscience, for example, editorial-
ized that "the major weakness" in my argument is that
boundaries must be drawn somewhere. It would seem absurd
to make no distinctions between species, but if it is wrong to
discriminate between humans and chimpanzees, then what
about macaques, cats or mice? Any sensible solution would
seem to require criteria for evaluating different animals'
mental capacities and for weighing them against the benefits
of experimentation, but Wise offers little guidance on how
this might be achieved. 96
In the Military Law Review, Lt. Commander R.A. Conrad wrote:
Wise leaves open the extension of legal personhood beyond
chimpanzees and bonobos. Except for establishing the crite-
ria that other animals granted such status should have
"minds," he provides no guidelines for making such future
extensions. He also concedes that not all animals have
"minds," and thus not all animals have a right to legal per-
sonhood. Yet, in this concession, he is guilty of discrimina-
tion and hypocrisy that highlight the primary fallacy of his
argument: where to draw the line. In effect he is stating that
some animals really are animals and deserve to be treated as
animals, with no rights, while other animals are essentially
human, or at least deserving of human-like status. 97
A similar concern motivates judge Posner's complaint that
96 Legal Challenges to Animal Experimentation, supra note 52, at 523.
"Lt. Corn. R.A. Conrad, Book Note, 166 MIL. L. REV. 226, 230 (2000).
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‘Viw want., judges. in gt,ori common-law fashion, to move
sup by %tip, and lor the first step simply to declare that
himpaneees have legal tights. But judges asked to step onto
a new path of doctrinal growth want to have some idea of
where the path leads, even if it would be unreasonable to in-
sist that the destination be clearly seen. Wise gives them no
idea."
Finally, Professor Epstein writes:
If that higher status [of legal persons] is offered to chimps
and bonobos, then what about orangutans and gorillas? Or
horses, dogs, and cows? All of these animals have a substan-
tial level of cognitive capacity, and wide range of emotions,
even if they do not have the same advanced cognitive skills of
the chimps and bonobos."
2. Liberty Rights
Judge Posner thinks Rattling the Cage "is not an intellectually ex-
citing book. I do not say this in criticism. Remember who Wise is: a
practicing lawyer who wants to persuade the legal profession that
courts should do much more to protect animals."'" Attorney Henry
Cohen finds it "essentially a conservative book." 191 Professor Nuss-
baum notes the book "develops no ambitious theories," which con-
cerns her, as the title of her review, "Animal Rights: The Need for a
Theoretical Basis," suggests.'" Professor Robert Verchick finds the
work "both radical and conservative at the same time," while noting
my failure "ultimately ... to offer any new principle that is itself im-
mune from bias."'"
Turning to bias, Professor Epstein claims, "It is not, nor has ever
been, immoral for human beings, as a species, to prefer their own
kind. What lion would deny it?"104 Lions may indeed prefer their own
98 Posner, supra note 1, at 532.
" Epstein, supra note 58, at 33.
100 Posner, supra note 1, at 527. I take the following discussion of practical autonomy
from chapter two of my upcoming book. See WISE, supra note 48, at 9-34. I give "realistic
autonomy" the more appropriate name of "practical autonomy." Id.
101 Henry Cohen, Raffling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 47 FED. LAw. 49, 50
(Mar./Apr. 2000) (book review).
1" Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1548.
1°3 Robert M. Verchick, A New Species of Rights, 89 CAL. L. REV. 207, 215, 219 (2001).
1" Epstein, supra note 58, at 37.
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kind. But it is both immoral and unlawful for judges to bias their deci-
sions. There are also difficulties in seeking moral guidance from non-
human animals such as lions, who probably lack moral capacity. Hu-
mans preferring their "kind," whether their kind is the same race, sex,
religion, nationality, or some other kind, has long infected human
activity and caused enormous suffering and unfairness. The morality
of a lion is nothing for a human to aspire to.
Professor Epstein argues, "We should not undermine, as would
surely be the case, the liberty and dignity of human beings by treating
animals as their moral equals and legal peers. 905
 Nature writer Kenan
Malik writes, "The real impact of the campaign for rights for apes is to
diminish rights for humans." 106 They imply legal rights are a zero sum
game. Technically they may be correct. The rights of one person may
necessarily decrease with an increase in the rights of another, for the
master's right over his slave becomes sharply curtailed when the slave
sheds his thinghood. If Professor Epstein is correct on either count—
humans may legitimately prefer their own kind or granting rights to
nonhuman animals may reduce the rights of human beings—every
human judge should be disqualified from determining whether non-
human animals have legal rights on the ground of bias, but then no
one would be left to judge.
This problem is typically solved in the United States by invoking
the "Rule of Necessity": if all judges are disqualified from deciding a
case, none are. 107 But this Rule does not give judges license to indulge
their biases. To the contrary, judges ruling from necessity must exert
every ounce of moral strength, every particle of objectivity they pos-
sess, to rule as fairly as they can, always keeping in mind they are
prone to decide in their own favor and that long-standing inequities
have, in Professor Tribe's words, only "survived this long because they
have become [so] ingrained in our modes of thought; the [U.S.] Su-
preme Court recognized a century ago that `habitual' discriminations
are the hardest to eradicate. "108
Judge Posner and Professor Verchick are correct: Rattling the Cage
was never intended to be an intellectually exciting book; nor was it
intended to create intellectually ambitious theories nor develop novel
legal principles. "Animal rights" may demand a firmer theoretical ba-
los Id. at 37.
" Kenan Malik, Rights and Wrongs, 406 NATURE 675, 676 (2000).
107 See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-16 (1980).
1°8
 LAURENCE H. TatnE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1518 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting
Str-auder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880)).
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sis, as Professor Nussbaum argues. Yet, isn't it asking too much to de-
mand the theoretical bases of "animal rights" be firmer than those of
"human rights"? Professor Nussbaum agrees that even "human rights
is by no means a crystal-clear idea. Rights have been understood in
many different ways, and difficult theoretical questions are frequently
obscured by the use of rights language, which can give the illusion of
agreement where there is deep philosophical disagreement" about
the basis, origin, function, and process of rights. 109
a. Where Do Basic Rights Come From?
At least some nonlawyer critics of Rattling the Cage draw from legal
positivism in arguing that basic rights derive "from the state."'" I use
"legal nonpositivism" to refer to rights claimed to derive from some
source other than the state; these include natural rights, human
rights, fundamental rights, and indeed, foundationalism in genera1. 111
Foundationalism's most serious problem is that there is no agreement
about which of the many possible sources of human rights is the true
or legitimate source. Legal positivism, however, is not without its flaws.
As Professor Mary Ann Glendon writes:
Prior to World War II, legal positivism . . . flourished in the
United States and Europe and was dogma in the Soviet Un-
ion. But legally sanctioned atrocities committed in Nazi
Germany . . . caused many people to reevaluate the proposi-
tion that there is no higher law by which the laws of nation-
states can be judged. 112
Judge Posner embraces a pragmatism that rejects the use of first prin-
ciples to deterMine how to treat nonhuman animals because we can-
not agree on what these first principles are.'" On the other hand,
Professor Tribe thinks that to search for a "non-intuitive, non-spiritual
wholly objective and supposedly scientifically-based formula ... [for]
legal rights is to tilt at windmills" and that "to argue that a chimpan-
zee is entitled to rights because of what goes on in his mind is to
commit the Naturalistic Fallacy, illegitimately moving from 'is' to
`ought. "114
102 MARTHA C. Nos SBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 97 (2000).
110 Hutchins, supra note 53, at 856; see Malik, supra note 106, at 675.
111 E.g., Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 806 (1998).
112 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW 176 (2001).
113 Posner, supra note 1, at 534.
114 Tribe, supra note 75, at 5.
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This conflict, often stated as a conflict between natural law and
legal positivism, has been resolved in favor of natural law. Not only the
international law of fundamental rights, but foreign law and United
States law at every level is saturated in legal nonpositivism.n5
 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, writes Professor Glendon,
"implicitly rejected the positivist position by stating that fundamental
rights are recognized, rather than conferred," therefore "trac[ing]
[the Declaration's] legitimacy to [the] fundamental characteristics of
human nature." 116 She relates that UNESCO set up a philosophers
committee to help determine what rights might be legitimately
claimed to be universal.
The UNESCO group concluded that it was possible to
achieve agreement across cultures concerning certain rights
that "may be seen as implicit in man's nature as an individual
and as a member of society and to follow from the funda-
mental right to live." But they harbored no illusions about
how deep the agreement they had discovered went. [French
philosopher Jacques] Maritain liked to tell the story of how a
visitor at one meeting expressed astonishment that champi-
ons of violently opposed ideologies had been able to agree
on a list of fundamental rights. The man was told: `Yes, we
agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us
why. "117
Over the last half-century, "a universally valid core of nonderoga-
ble human rights" have been agreed upon and recognized in at least
four classes of international instruments that do not demand agree-
ment on why. 118 In the first are treaties, agreements, declarations, and
115 Wise, supra note 111, at 846-57.
116
 GLENDON, supra note 112, at 175, 176. See generally jack Donnelly, Human Rights as
Natural Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 391, 401-02 (1982) (noting that natural rights theory pre-
serves universality of human rights); Johannes Morsink, The Philosophy of the Universal Decla-
iation, 6 Hum. RTS. Q. 309 (1984) (the Declaration's rights are rooted in traditional natu-
ral rights).
117 GLENDON, supra note 112, at 77, (quotingfacques Maritain, Introduction, in HUMAN
RIGHTS 9 (UNESCO ed., 1949)).
118
 DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (1991).
These include freedom from attacks upon bodily integrity, slavery, and torinre. Id.; see also
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS —THE: OXFORD AMNIA I Y Lit .i	 s
1993 62, 71 (Stephen Slime & Susan fluricy eds., 1991 ► .1111/111111' 1I . A111.41 ,11. l00e	 'pi .1
Human Rights in International tam 82 col cm. l.. 14 v. 11111. 1128- 4.",J 4 14:v1i 410444411411"w,
against genocide• format., and ,lastly Lill' huicidenvin.11 bu n ion Muh l. no,ict 111%1.•111M%
internal:ion:11 law); Joint it,nsIs. The him u/ an (hrthipprng “nur, Ili I, 7	 POW 1 I 40,11
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resolutions that emphasize inalienable negative rights and immunities
and declare that humans have "inherent dignity" or possess "funda-
mental freedoms" or "inalienable rights," phrases that descend from
such natural rights documents as the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. 119 Many,
like the Universal Declaration, recognize that human rights derive
from the characteristics or qualities of human personality and soci-
ety.n° A second class designates certain rights "nonderogable," even in
cases of public emergency involving the life of the nation, while a
third class acknowledges that certain obligations are created ergo. (wi-
nes ("flowing to all"). A fourth concerns jus cogens ("compelling law"),
those international preemptory norms that restrict the ability of states
to contract in violation of these norms and voids treaties and other
instruments that violate them. 121 Why should chimpanzees and bono-
bos, and perhaps other nonhuman animals, not be beneficiaries of a
similarly valid core of nonderogable rights?
STUD. 1, 14, 19 n.22 (1987) (designation of fundamental liberties and freedoms removes
them from political debate). "'Human rights' refers to freedoms, immunities, and benefits
which, according to widely accepted contemporary values, every human being should en-
joy in the society in which he or she lives." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 701, ant. a (1986). For a discussion of
international dignity-rights, see Wise, supra note 111, at 846-57.
119 See Samuel S. Kim, Global Human Rights and World Order; in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND A JUST WORLD ORDER 356, 358 (Richard A. Falk, et al. eds., 1991); PAUL SIEGHART,
THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND—AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
CODE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 63 (1985); Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, 6 Hum. RTS. Q. 257,
264-65 (1984). These instruments implicitly recognize that human beings "share some
common beliefs concerning human dignity but also ... a common concern to protect
human dignity by a body of law that stands above the law of individual states." Harold J.
Berman, Thwanis an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779,
798 (1988). "The United Nations' concept of human rights embraces this natural law con-
cept of rights." Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982), despite the rejection of repeated attempts
to attribute them to a divine source; see also SIEGHART, supra at 63; SURYA PRAKASH SINHA,
WHAT IS LAW? —THE DIFFERING THEORIES OF JURISPRUDENCE 81-82 (1989).
ISO See Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 CoLum. L. REV. 405, 409 (1979);
Warren Christopher, Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands, Address be-
fore the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria (June 14, 1993), at 1
("America's identity as a nation derives from our dedication to the proposition 'that all
Men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.'")
(transcript on file with author).
121 While nonderogability and jus cogens are different principles with different con-
cerns, a derogable human rights norm cannot be jus cogent, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 118, at § 702, rptrs.
notes,1 11(1986).
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b. How "Do We Ground the Moral Conviction that Each Human Being Is
Inviolable and All Human Beings Are of Equal Dignity?" 122
Professor Nussbaum notes the problem with Stoic views about
nonhuman animals is the "sharp discontinuity in nature," resting on
"the idea that moral capacity belongs to all and only humans and that
this capacity is what raises us above 'the beasts.' "123
Indeed, Professor Nussbaum goes on to assert:
It is not that Wise is wrong to find the Stoic views about dis-
continuity inadequate. The problem is, what do we do with-
out them? How, if not in the Stoics' way, do we ground the
moral conviction that each human being is inviolable and all
human beings are of equal dignity? Once we recognize that
nature is a continuum and that capacities of chimpanzees
overlap with those of humans, what is to prevent us from
recognizing a continuum within the human species, and say-
ing (as people are always keen to do) that some humans are
more capable than others, that some are worth more than
others? Against that kind of thinking, the idea that every
human has something precious that is found nowhere else in
nature is quite a valuable resource.
Think about people living in extreme poverty, such as the
women with whom I work in India . . . These Indian women
are not considered important. . . . It is very important to
them, and to the activists and political thinkers who try to
improve their lot, to say that every human life is precious
and that all are of boundless worth.'"
And, Nussbaum continues, what if there are not enough food and re-
sources for both human and nonhuman animals?
Poor people do not like forest preserves in which they can-
not forage for food, for example. The romanticism of nature
that such people find in many American and European visi-
tors scares them. They want to say, we are special. We need to
live. I want to say that too. So there is a problem: if we do not
122 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1521.
123 Id. at 1520.
I" Id. at 1521.
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cling to some form of the Stoic dichotomy,, how are we to say
that? 125
Judge Posner expressed a related argument claiming that "if we fail to
maintain a bright line between animals and human beings, we may
end up by treating human beings as badly as we treat animals ... .
[1] here may be a social value in a rhetoric of human specialty." 129
There are at least three arguments here. One is that, if we allow
ourselves to recognize a continuum among species, we may feel more
free to recognize a continuum within the human species. Professor
Paul Waldau notes:
The two obvious principal ideas of speciesism are the con-
trasting inclusion of all members of the human species and
exclusion of all members of all other species from certain
privileged considerations. Merely asserting the dignity of
each and every human, without any related exclusion of
nonhumans' interests, value, or moral considerability, would
in no way be speciesist. An element of pervasive exclusion is
a critical addition .. a working definition is given.. . . Spe-
ciesism is the inclusion of all human animals within, and the
exclusion of all other animals from, the moral circle.'"
There is no logical reason why we must ground a conviction that a
human being is inviolable and all human beings are of equal dignity
on the exclusion of other beings. The foremost advocate of a contin-
uum among species, Charles Darwin, hated black chattel slavery. 129
Louis Agassiz hated Darwinism, rejected evolution, and thought
blacks a different species from, and inferior to, whites. 129 If we open
our moral umbrella a bit to shelter apes or primates or mammals or
vertebrates, and believe every one of them inviolable and equal in
dignity, why would we no longer believe the same of all humans, who
would be a subset of those whom we believe to be inviolable and of
125 Id.
126 Posner, supra note 1, at 535. Posner's and Nussbaum's articles were written near the
same time and each acknowledge the help of the other. See Nussbaum, supra note 4, at
1506; Posner, supra note 1, at 527.
In PAUL WALDAU, THE SPECTER OF SPECIESISM -BUDDHIST AND CHRISTIAN VIEWS OF
ANIMALS 38 (2001).
1113 See jonN BOWLBY, CHARLES DARWIN-A NEW LIFE 115, 134,155 (1990); CHARLES
DARWIN, THE VOYAGE OF 'tHE BEAGLE 502,526-27 (Charles W. Eliot ed., P.F. Collier & Son
1909) (1845).
129 See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 42-50 (1981); Louts MENAND,
THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 124-29 (2001).
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equal dignity? Just as with poor Indian women, there are nonhuman
animals whose cognitive abilities allow them to think their life is im-
portant to them, a matter important as well to the activists and politi-
cal thinkers trying to improve their lot.'"
A second argument is that if we do not cling to the Stoic dichot-
omy, how can we justify always siding with humans whenever their vital
interests conflict with the interests of nonhuman animals? Why should
we automatically side with every human when an important interest
conflicts with the vital interest of any nonhuman? This prejudges the
ultimate question as to whether any nonhuman animal, even bonobos
and chimpanzees, should be entitled to basic rights that might trump
human interests.
The third argument is that, without the Stoic dichotomy, we
might end up treating some humans as badly as we treat nonhuman
animals. For "animals and human beings," substitute "blacks and
whites," "Moslems and Christians," or "Catholics and Protestants" in
Judge Posner's worry that "if we fail to maintain a bright line between
animals and human beings, we may end up treating animals as badly
as we treat human beings . . . . [T] here may be a social value in a
rhetoric of human specialty."151 The sentence remains as true for one
as for any of the others. There is no reason specifically linked to the
rights of nonhuman animals to believe that we may ever treat humans
as badly as we do nonhuman animals.
Professor Nussbaum is genuinely concerned with the poor.' Wil-
liam Windham, Member of Parliament for Norwich, was not when he
appealed to the freedom of the poor to engage in their traditional
"enjoyments" of bull-baiting to defeat the first attempt at legislating
anti-cruelty statutes in the UK in 1800 and 1802. 153 At nearly the same
time, abolitionists were fighting arguments in Parliament that de-
struction of the slave trade would ruin Britain and her colonies and
throw thousands of sailors out of work. 134 Liverpool's sailmakers, bak-
' 3° E.g., WISE, supra note 48, at 109-11, 152-54, 169-71, 188-89, 222-24 (gorillas,
orangutans, Atlantic bottlenosed dolphins, African grey parrots, and Indian elephants
show evidence of self-awareness); WISE, supra note 2, at 198-201 (chimpanzees and bono-
bos show evidence of self-awareness).
131 Posner, supra note 1, at 535.
1" See Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1521.
In RADFORD, supra note 36, at 33-34.
134
	 THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE-THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE
1440-1870, at 506, 508, 513, 525, 528, 554 (1997).
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ers, and gunmakers petitioned Parliament to keep the slavers sail-
ing. 159 To whom would they sell their sails, biscuits, and guns?" 6
c. Realistic Autonomy as Sufficient for Basic Rights
If "discrimination" is defined as "'an act based on prejudice,' and
its essential elements [include] ... a decision based on invidious
rather than rational grounds," it is hard to make Lt. Commander
Conrad's charge of discrimination stick.'" What is necessary for basic
human rights remains controversial after centuries. I do not intend to
try to resolve this controversy. Neither do I intend to burden the ar-
gument for the basic rights of chimpanzees and bonobos with a de-
mand for certainties greater than those demanded by the arguments
for basic human rights.
I have argued that the basic legal rights of nonhuman animals
should be derived from the same legal sources as the basic rights of
humans, and for the same reasons. 138 That is why Rattling the Cage may
rightly be described as conservative. It so happens there is no agree-
ment as to what those sources are. But, rightly or wrongly, fundamen-
tal human rights are often derived from liberty and equality. These
are therefore the well from which the fundamental rights of nonhu-
man animals may be drawn.
Liberty entitles one to be treated a certain way because of how
one is put together. How others are treated is irrelevant. One's liberty
rights turn on one's qualities. Since World War II, nations agree the
liberty to act as one pleases stops somewhere, though they do not
agree where."9 Yet some absolute and irreducible minimum degree of
bodily liberty and bodily integrity are everywhere sacrosanct. If we
trespass upon them we inflict the gravest injustice, for we treat others
as slaves and things. 14°
Of what he sees as my willingness "to accept the possibility that
[my] theory would sacrifice rabbits and mice in exchange for stronger
and more individualized liberties for 'brainier' species," Professor
Verchick insightfully observes that "[h]aving chosen to base [my] de-
sign on classical rights themes, the Greek ideal of reason is one [I am]
"5 See id. at 515.
138 Id. at 515-16.
1a7 supra note 108, at 1515.
138 Wise, supra note 111, at 845-68.
1" Id. at 845-47.
140 Id. at 845.
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fated to embrace."141 Herein lies an important truth: judges and the
common law have long embraced, if not the Greek ideal of reason,
then autonomy or self-determination both as an important aspect of
liberty and one that is, I argue, sufficient, though not necessary, for
basic legal rights. 142
 An animal's species is irrelevant to her entitle-
ment to rights; any who possesses a "realistic autonomy" has what is
sufficient for the basic rights to bodily integrity and bodily liberty both
as a matter of liberty and equality)"
I emphasize "sufficient." Professor Nussbaum believes I argue
that autonomy is necessary, not just sufficient, for basic legal rights,'"
as does Professor Tribe. 145 Alas, I make the argument that realistic or
practical autonomy is sufficient, not necessary, for basic legal rights
most clearly in the index of Rattling the Cage, much more so in an ear-
lier law review article. 1" Professor Tribe understands I argue that be-
ing human is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for end-
dement to legal rights. 147 That evidently concerns him:
If your theory is that simply being human cannot entitle you
to basic rights, although it might be nice if they were given
to you, I think you are on an awfully steep and slippery slope
that we would do well to avoid. Once we have said that in-
fants and very old people . . . have no rights unless we
choose to grant them, we must decide about people who are
three-quarters of the way to such a condition. I needn't spell
it all out, but the possibilities are genocidal and horrific and
reminiscent of slavery and of the holocaust. 1"
First, I argue that a realistic or practical autonomy is a sufficient,
not a necessary, condition for legal rights. Other grounds for entitle-
ment to basic rights may exist. Second, Professor Tribe assumes that
all human beings deserve basic rights. 142 While "the thesis that hu-
mans should be ascribed rights simply for being human has received
141 Verchick, supra note 103, at 220.
142 See WISE, supra note 2, at 243-48.
14/ See id. at 247-48; see also id. at 63-87,293-70.
144
 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1533-35.
145 Tribe, supra note 75, at 7.
145 Wise, supra note 2, at 342 ("autonomy—sufficient for legal rights"); Wise, supra
note 111, at 868,875.
147 Tribe, supra note 75, at 7.
148 Id.
149 See id.
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practically no support from philosophers,"150 it has received a little. In
the view of Professor Lloyd Weinreb,
The starting point [for legal rights] is a categorical distinc-
tion between persons and things . . . inclusion in one cate-
gory or the other is ordinarily settled by a single, uniform
rule that the category of persons is coextensive with the class
of human beings: All human beings are persons, and all per-
sons are human beings. 151
But to Professor L.W. Sumner, "it is quite inconceivable that the ex-
tension of any right should coincide exactly with the boundaries of
our species. It is thus quite inconceivable that we have any rights sim-
ply because we are human."'" I argued in Rattling the Cage that, be-
cause Professor Weinreb's categorical distinction conflicts with over-
arching Western values and principles of fairness, liberty, equality, and
reasoned judicial decision-making, Professor Sumner is correct. It "is
inconceivable, in the sense that it is irrational or incredible" that
rights should be granted to humans simply because they are hu-
mans.'" Of what inherent value could mere species membership pos-
sibly be? What interests could mere species membership possibly pro-
tect, unless these interests are connected to empirical qualities?
Species is merely a taxonomic classification of a population of geneti-
cally similar individuals able naturally to interbreed.'" It is not an
empirical quality as autonomy, self-determination, cognition, and sen-
tience are.'"
I imagined the discovery of a stout band of Neanderthals or Homo
erectus, both possessed of highly complex minds, who managed to sur-
vive the millenia in some remote redoubt in Spanish Andulusia or
java. 156 Neither are Homo sapiens, yet, could we,
without hesitation capture and exhibit them, breed and eat
them, and force them into biomedical research? If their
156 Daniel Wilder, Concepts of Personhood: A Philosophical Perspective, in DEFINING HUMAN
LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 13, 19 (Margery W. Shaw & A. Edward
Doudera, eds., 1983).
151 LLOYD L. WEINREB, OEDIPUS AT FENWAY PARK 110 (1994).
155 L.W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS 206 (1987) (referring to both
the benefit/interest and choice/control models of claim-rights).
155 WISE, supra note 2, at 241.
IM See EDWARD 0. WILSON, The DIVERSITY OF LIFE 38 (1992).
I85 See id.
156 WISE, supra note 2, at 242-43,
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minds make us hesitate and in that moment, if we open up
our minds to the possibility that they might be eligible for
dignity-rights, shouldn't the minds of chimpanzees and
bonobos make us hesitate as well?157
A liberty right grounded in autonomy demands a mind. "If you
think," I wrote, "that nonhuman animals are never, ever conscious,
then they are mindless, feelingless, thoughtless brutes that deserve no
more legal rights than a toaster." 158 Isaiah Berlin wrote, "if the essence
of men is that they are autonomous beings . . . then nothing is worse
than to treat them as if they were not autonomous, but natural ob-
jects, played on by causal influences, creatures at the mercy of exter-
nal stimuli."159 This should hold for any autonomous being; species
should be irrelevant.
According to Professor C.K. Allen:
The essential difference between person and thing seems to
lie in the quality of volition. Animate creatures clearly possess
some kind of motive power which corresponds with the hu-
man will; it may be a very strong force indeed—thus if we
wish to attribute to a man a particularly obstinate will, we
compare him to a mule. But it is not a kind of will which is
recognized by law; it cannot, in modern societies, involve the
creature which exercises it in any consequences of right or
liability. Nor do we attribute to the creatures what is closely
akin to this volitional capacity, that is, the power of reason.
Hence a thing has been defined [as having a] "volitionless Na-
ture."16°
Things do not act autonomously. Persons do. Things cannot self-
determine. Persons can. Things lack volition. Persons do not. Persons
have will.l6l Professor Allen implies a mule's will is unrecognized in
law because, though purposeful, it comes from instinct, which is the
antithesis of volition. The mule has a will, he just cannot control it.
Whether we call it self-determination, autonomy, or volition, if a being
has it, she is entitled to basic liberty rights.
1" Id. at 243.
158 Id. at 131.
159 Berlin, supra note 95, at 208.
lw Carleton Kemp Allen, Things, 28 CAL. L. REV. 421, 424 (1940) (quoting SIR THO-
MAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 103 (13th ed. 1924) (emphasis added) (translat-
ing BARON, PANDEKTEN, § 37)); see POUND, supra note 83, at 530-31.
101 See POUND, supra note 83, at 194-99.
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Philosophers often understand autonomy, which includes self-
determination and volition, the way Kant did two centuries ago. I call
his "full autonomy." This demands that, in determining what I ought
to do in any situation I analyze what others can and ought to do, and
rationally analyze whether it would be right to act in one way or an-
other, keeping in mind that I should act only as I would want others to
act. 162 Kant believed nonhuman animals, and probably children, act
from desire. 163 Fully autonomous beings act completely rationally and
their ability to do that demands they be treated as persons.'"
Kant was not the only philosOpher to try to knit hyper-rationality
into the fabric of liberty. 168 ' The most honest concede what philoso-
pher Carl Wellman calls a "monstrous conclusion:" a great many hu-
man beings do not make the cut. 166 Most normal adults lack full
autonomy and, indeed, infants,. children, the severely mentally re-
tarded or autistic, the senile, and the persistently vegetative never
come close. 167 Were judges to accept full autonomy as a prerequisite
for personhood, they would have to exclude most humans.
Judges decisively reject Kant's full autonomy. Events on February
29, 2000, in the United States show how wrong Kant was. A six-year
old Michigan first-grader smuggled a handgun into school and shot a
classmate to death. 168 The County Prosecutor issued a statement that
"Where is a presumption in law that a child . . . is not criminally re-
sponsible and can't form an intent to kill. Obviously, he has done a
very terrible thing today, but legally he can't be held criminally re-
sponsible."169 The child couldn't successfully be sued civilly, either.
162 WISE, supra note 2, at 246.
163 See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 229 (1993).
164 See id. at 227-28. See also HJ. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE-A STUDY IN
KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 180-84,199,242-47 (1947).
165 See Berlin, supra note 95, at 170; see also Michael Allen Fox, Animal Experimentation: A
Philosopher's Changing Views, in 3 BETWEEN THE SPECIES 260 (Spring 1987).
1436 CARL WELLMAN, REAL RIGHTS 113-14 (1995); see also DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, BA-
BIES AND BEASTS 45-140 (1997) (discussing many modern philosophers); R.G. FREY, IN-
TERESTS AND RIGHTS-THE CASE AGAINST ANIMALS 30 (1980); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any
Natural Rights?, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 79,82 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); A. JOHN SIM-
MONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 201 n.93 (1992) (listing modern philosophers
who claim that children cannot have rights because they lack the capacities for agency,
rationality, or autonomy); Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for
Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 987-99
(1993) (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, and Mill).
167 See Hart, supra note 166, at 82.
in Boy, 6, Fatally Shoots Classmate in Mich. School, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1,2000, at Al .
169 id.
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Isaiah Berlin explained that, for Kant, "[f]reedom is not freedom
to do what is irrational, or stupid, or wrong." 17° But in courtrooms lib-
erty rights mean freedom to do the irrational, stupid, even the wrong.
That is why judges generally honor nonrational, even irrational,
choices that may even cut against a decision-maker's best interests. 171
Self-determination may even trump human life. 112 The determination
of Jehovah's Witnesses to die rather than accept blood transfusions is
nonrational. Yet judges accept them. The mentally ill are not usually
confined, against their wishes, unless they are dangerous to them-
selves or others."5
Judges who deny personhood to every nonhuman animal act ar-
bitrarily. They don't admit they do. Instead they use legal fictions,
transparent lies they insist we believe, that allow them to attribute per-
sonhood .to humans lacking consciousness, even brains, to ships,
trusts, corporations, even religious idols. 174
 They pretend these have
autonomy. Legal scholar John Chipman Gray couldn't see any differ-
ence between pretending will-less humans have one and doing the
same for nonhuman animals.175
 Because legal fictions may cloak
abuses of judicial power, Jeremy Bentham characterized them as a
"syphilis . . . [that] carries into every part of the system the principle of
rottenness. "176
A fair and rational alternative exists, and it is this: most moral
and legal philosophers, and nearly every common law judge, recog-
nize that less complex autonomies exist and that a being can be
autonomous if she has preferences and the ability to act to satisfy
them, or if she can cope with changed circumstances, or if she can
make choices, even if she can't evaluate their merits very well, or if
1" Berlin, supra note 95, at 148.
1 ^1 E.g., Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, 1 All E.R. 821, 843, 848 (Fam. 1992), affd, 1 All
E.R. 858, 858 (CA 1993); id. at 852 (Hoffman, 14.) (CA); affd, 1 All E.R. 858, 862 (H.L.
1993) (Lord Goff of Chieveley); id. at 889 (Lord Mustill); see WISE, supra note 2, at 247.
172 Airedale, 1 All E.R. at 851, 852 (Hoffman, LI); id. at 846 (Butler-Sloss, 140 (both of
the Court of Appeals); id. at 866 (Lord Goff of Chieveley).
173 E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Winterwerp v. Netherlands,
A. 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979).
174 E.g., Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Guardianship of Doe,
583 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Mass. 1992); id. at 1272-73 (Nolan; J., dissenting); id. at 1275
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (N.Y. 1917);
Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, 52 I.L.R. 245, 250 (1925); see POUND,
supra note 83, at 195, 197, 198.
155 GRAY, supra note 85, at 43.
1 " Jeremy Bentham, The Elements of the Art of Packing as Applied to Special juries, Particu-
larly in Cases of Libel Lau; in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENrritAm 92 (John Bowring ed.,
1962).
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she has desires and beliefs and can make at least some sound and ap-
propriate inferences from them.'" In Rattling the Cage, I describe
these autonomies as "realistic."'" I now think "practical" better de-
scribes them.'" Beings have practical autonomy, and are therefore
entitled to personhood and basic liberty rights, if they:
1. can desire;
2. intentionally try to fulfill their desire; and
3. possess a sense of self-sufficiency to allow them to under-
stand, even dimly, that they want something and are trying
to get it.
Consciousness, though not necessarily self-consciousness, and sen-
tience are implicit in practical autonomy.
3. Equality
The core of equality is that like beings should be treated alike.
Thus an animal might be entitled to basic rights, as a matter of equal-
ity, even if he or she lacks practical autonomy, so long as the sole
point of reference is not some quality that all human, but no nonhu-
man animals possess.'"
Perhaps unsurprisingly, for he is neither a philosopher nor a law-
yer, conservationist Michael Hutchins incorrectly understands my
equality claim to be the following:
Individual humans may differ in their mental and physical
capacities, but are none the less treated equally under the
law and granted certain basic rights. ... Some nonhuman
animals, such as chimpanzees and bonobos, share many
characteristics with humans 'and, in fact, are considered by
some to be in the same genus. . . Therefore, those nonhu-
mans should be granted similar legal rights.' 81
1" See CHRISTOPHER CHERNIAX, MINIMAL RATIONALITY 3-17 (1985); JAMES RACHELS,
CREATED FROM ANIMALS 140, 147 (1990); TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 84-
85 (1983); William A. Wright, Theating Animals as Ends, 271 VALUE INQUIRY 353, 857, 362
(1993).
178 WISE, supra note 2, at 247.
178
 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at 269-70 (definitions A.1.1.a & b;
A.1.2.a, b, & c).
180 See also WISE, supra note 2, at 82-87, 251-54.
181 Hutchins, supra note 53, at 856.
656	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 43:623
The claim is not that bonobos and chimpanzees are entitled to rights
because they share many characteristics with humans or just any char-
acteristic, for every being is both infinitely similar and infinitely dif-
ferent from every other. It is that they share relevant mental charac-
teristics: whatever humans have that entitles them to basic legal rights,
chimpanzees and bonobos have as well.
Hutchins's legal and moral arguments are broadly typical of
many made by scientists untrained in law or moral philosophy. A re-
cent book reviewer in Nature makes a similar point about the use of
nonhuman animals in biomedical research:
The scientists writing . . . believe that humans matter more
than animals do, but their moral arguments are often su-
perficial. Placing emphasis on the benefits we would lose if
we gave up animal research does not prove that animals have
no moral rights, or that their interests are inherently less
valuable than our own. Neither our superior cognitive abili-
ties nor the fact that animals treat each other badly settles
the question of our duties toward them. And one reads with
embarrassment two evolutionary biologists decrying animal
rights as a "maladaptive philosophy" because it fails to pro-
mote the interests of our species. 182
Hutchins, for example, doesn't value equality: "[U] nlike [Wise,] I
have learned to live with paradox, rather than seeking fairness and
consistency in all things. Nature is far from even handed." 183 His dis-
dain for consistency or fairness is clearly illustrated by his statement,
"I believe that animal populations must sometimes be reduced
through killing to prevent overpopulation. I believe that the world's
human population is also too large, and for this reason I have chosen
to adopt rather than reproducing myself."184
 Despite his concession
that some nonhuman animals have emotions and think, Hutchins
writes, "my teeth are designed for an omnivorous diet, and I view the
ingestion of animal as well as vegetable protein as part of my evolu-
tionary history." 185
 On reading this, however, anthropologist Barbara
152 William H. Shaw, Costs and Benefits of Inflicting Pain, 414 NATURE 396, 396 (2001)
(reviewing TOM REGAN, DEFENDING ANIMAL RIGHTS (2001) & ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL &
JEFFREY PAUL, WHY ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION MATFERS: THE USE OF ANIMUS IN NII
CAL RESEARCH (2001)).
1 " 1 IlliChillS. s ltfrif 1111k 53, at 87)6.
181 Id. at 851i.
1 S5 M.; see airsu 111/3135 1113311' .57 .111411 at I I nut Jr m ling
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King noted, "If he's going to argue consistently from the point of view
of his evolutionary past, he's leaving himself open to some very inter-
esting lifestyle changes, in his diet and otherwise."'" Primatologist
Rob Shumaker wrote "the old `my teeth are designed to eat meat' ar-
gument should be put on life-support. If this is true, why don't gorillas
eat meat?"197
Every civil rights advocate for human or nonhuman animals be-
lieves in individual rights. But " [t] he primary goal of the environ-
mental/conservation ethic," Hutchins writes, "is to preserve naturally
occurring biological diversity."'" It has nothing to do with individual
rights, indeed, it does not value the individual, but the species and
ecosystems.'" Hutchins understands this, but mistakenly believes
animal rights advocates do not. They think they possess, he believes, a
"pro-conservation" philosophy, when "in many cases, the goal of con-
serving species and ecosystems is in direct conflict with the goal of
individual animal rights."199
 "If nonhuman animals are granted `legal
personhood,'" he says, "then many endangered species could suf-
fer."191 This potential conflict is well-known within the animal rights
movement and has been a staple of my "Animal Rights Law" classes
since 1990. 192 Animal rights advocates do not automatically value an
individual of an endangered species more than any other individual
in the same way that human rights advocates do not value an individ-
ual member of a minority over a member of a majority race, religion,
or nationality.
The irony of Hutchins's argument with respect to highly endan-
gered chimpanzees and bonobos is that their legal thinghood exposes
them to the predations of legal persons. That is why they are being
driven to extinction by an African bushmeat trade, in which wild apes
are killed for food. If legal personhood and legal rights are as impor-
tant as I argue they are, granting these to chimpanzees and bonobos
188
 Comm unication from Professor Barbara J. King (Nov. 25, 2001).
187 Comm unication from Rob Shumaker (May 12, 2001).
188 Michael Hutchins & Christen Wemmer, Wildlife Conservation and Animal Rights: Are
They Compatible?, in ADVANCES IN ANIMAL WELFARE SCIENCE 1986/87, at 112 (Michael W.
Fox & Linda D. Mickley eds., 1987).
189 see id.
199 Ilutchins, supra note 53, at 857. See Hutchins & Weminer, supra note 188, at 128.
191 Hutchins, supra note 53, at 857.
192
 See generally THE ANIMAL RIGHTS/ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS DEBATE—THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE (Eugene C. Hargrove ed., 1992).
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would go far toward protecting them. Ironically, Hutchins opposes
this proposa1. 195
Instead, Hutchins claims, I am being "biologically naive." 194 But
his argument illustrates the position philosopher Robert Nozick set
forth more than twenty-five years ago: "utilitarianism for animals, Kan-
tianism for people."195 In other words, what is morally right for non-
human animals is utilitarianism, the greatest good for the greatest
number of nonhuman animals, with the individual of no inherent
value, but every human being is an end in him or herself. 196 When a
nonhuman species overpopulates, kill the "excess"; when humans
overpopulate, Hutchins decides to solve the problem by adopting a
child. Who is being "biologically naive?"
Hutchins's argument is not an appeal to justice, but to specie-
sism, arbitrariness, and bias. Hutchins does not even commit the
"Naturalistic Fallacy," confusing what is with what is right. Hutchins
does not care what is right. He draws his moral and legal lessons from
an amoral nature populated by amoral creatures. Nature is neither
even-handed nor fair. But I do not use the behavior of amoral beings,
past and present, as a model for justice or as a platform from which to
argue for justice for chimpanzees and bonobos. And, unlike Hutch-
ins, I accept that equality is, and has long been, a major value of
American and international law, and understand that fundamental
nonhuman rights can be derived from it in the same way that funda-
mental human rights can be. 197 Hutchins concedes that the animal
rights "focus on individual animals, as opposed to populations, spe-
cies, and ecosystems ... may itself be based on the cultural biases of
its progenitors. Western cultures do tend to place more emphasis on
the rights of the individual, as opposed to the welfare of society as a
whole."195 That is why my arguments lie within the mainstream of
Western justice and Hutchins's do not. No modern judge is likely to
accept that paradox or evolutionary history is more acceptable than
eqiiiality, fairness and consistency in judicial decision-making.
Damon Linker argued:
[T] he evidence adduced by Steven Wise to suggest that pri-
mates [sic] are capable of forming rudimentary plans and
193 Hutchins, supra note 53, at 129.
In Id. at 857.
in ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 39 (1974).
196 See id.
197 Wise, supra note 111, at 888-90.
in Hutchins & Wemmer, supra note 188, at 129 (citations omitted).
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expectations fails to demonstrate they are equal to human
beings in any significant sense. Men and women use their
"autonomy" in a world defined not by the simple imperatives
of survival but by ideas of virtue and vice, beauty and ugli-
ness, right and wrong.'
Linker mixes the arguments from liberty and equality. Read most
generously, he claims the relevant "like" is the ability to use one's
autonomy in a complex world of ideas and ideals, which resembles
Kantian "full autonomy." We know many humans live in that world,
but many do not, and it is unclear why the ability to use autonomy in a
complex world of ideas and ideals should be necessary for the basic
immunity of bodily integrity.
Even great apes "should not be granted the same legal rights as
humans," says Michael Hutchins. 200 I never claimed they should, as
Professor Nussbaum recognized:
Giving apes legal rights does not mean giving them the same
rights as adult humans. As with mentally disabled humans, a
right may be qualified in certain ways in keeping with the
creature's level of understanding. Apes may have fewer
rights in certain areas, and the rights they have may be more
narrowly conceived. Finally, they may be given only certain
elements of a complex right. 201
Critics fear that, if one breaks through the legal wall that separates
humans from every other animal, there is no reasonable stopping
place, either with respect to which nonhuman animals should be enti-
tled to rights or the rights to which they would be entitled Judge Pos-
ner acknowledges, for example, that I seek judges,
in good common-law fashion, to move step-by-step, and for
the first step simply to declare that chimpanzees have legal
rights. But judges asked to step onto a new path of doctrinal
growth want to have some idea of where the path leads, even
if it would be unreasonable to insist that the destination be
clearly seen. 202
199 Damon Linker, Rights for Rodents, COMMENT., Apr. 2001, at 41, 43.
2" Hutchins, supra note 53, at 856.
"'Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1548 (citations omitted).
402 Posner, supra note 1, at 532. Conservationist Michael Hutchins, whose views on the
complexities of the judicial system should probably be taken with the seriousness of Judge
Posner's views, if any, on the complexities of conservation, insists loine of the most co-
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The argument that beings should be lifted from thinghood, with no
rights, straight to full and equal status, as Judge Posner and Michael
Hutchins imply, is more likely to be made by one who opposes lifting
them from thinghood in the first place.203
In 1858, Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas locked in a
monumental series of debates across the Illinois prairie to decide a
seat in the United States Senate.2" Douglas tarred Lincoln an aboli-
tionist, committed to perfect equality between whites and blacks. 205 In
pre-Civil War Illinois, this was like Joseph McCarthy happening to
mention in 1952 that you were a Communist.206 The American gov-
ernment, Douglas insisted, had been "made by white men for the
benefit of white men and their posterity forever."207 By his day's stan-
dards, Lincoln was a moderately-enlightened thinker about black
chattel slavery. He always opposed it, even if he did not always support
social and political equality for blacks.208 But he made it the central
issue of his Senate campaign, accentuating "the difference between
those who think it wrong and those who do not think it wrong," and
squarely traced it to the assertion of the Declaration of Independence
that "all men are created equal."S® That was fine with Douglas, for it
allowed him to press the attack. 210 Lincoln, he exclaimed, was a radi-
cal, committed not just to freedom for the slave, but to the complete
social and political equality of white and black. 211 Lincoln correctly
gent arguments against 'legal personhood' for nonhuman animals is that it could plunge
our judicial system into chaos." Hutchins, supra note 53, at 857. It is hard to imagine how
granting basic legal rights to three thousand chimpanzees and bonobos, at least, could
plunge the American judicial system into chaos.
2°5 The same is true for those who argue that if nonhuman animals get legal rights, we
will be morally obligated to keep the peace in the animal kingdom. See Linker, supra note
46, at 10; Epstein, supra note 58, at 37.
"1 Harold Holzer, Introduction to THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 1-3 (Harold Holzer
ed., 1993).
205 See The Fifth Joint Debate at Galesburg (Oct. 7, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DE-
BATES 246 (Harold Holzer ed., 1993); The Sixth faint Debate at Quincy (Oct. 13, 1858), in THE
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 205, at 300.
206 J.G. RANDALL, LINCOLN AND THE SOUTH 33 (1946).
207 The Fifth Joint Debate, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 205, at 248.
2" DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 221 (1995).
209 M; see DAVID ZAREFSKY, LINCOLN, DOUGLAS, AND SLAVERY—IN THE CRUCIBLE OF
PUBLIC DEBATE 149 (1990); The Sixth Joint Debate, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES,
supra note 205, at 290.
210 See ZAREFSKY, supra note 209, at 53.
2" Sae id.
20021
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sensed that, if Douglas succeeded, he was lost, and edged toward the
center.212
Lincoln called for slavery's end, while attempting to dodge the
stones of "perfect equality" that Douglas kept hurling. 2" During their
fourth debate at Charleston, Lincoln argued against the view that,
[B]ecause the white man is to have the superior position that
the negro should be denied everything. I do not perceive
because I do not court a negro woman for a [slave] that I
must necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is
that I can just leave her alone.214
In the sixth debate at Quincy, he was even more explicit:
I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality
between the white and the black races . . . but ... there is no
reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the
natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independ-
ence—the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness.2"
Historians have made clear what Lincoln was trying to do. 216 Pro-
fessor David Zarefsky argues Lincoln avoided "the slippery slope by
which freedom led to racial equality" by declaring freedom an eco-
nomic right that did not necessarily carry social and political equality
with 4.217 Professor David Potter labeled Lincoln's the "minimum anti-
slavery position," while Professor Garry Wills said Lincoln's "nub, the
realizable minimum," was that "[a] t the very least, it was wrong to
treat human beings as property."2" Lincoln was a famously practical
lawyer, president, and commander-in-chief, known in the courtroom,
political arena, and war room for affably conceding one nonessential
point after another, often lulling his opponent into believing he had
212 See DAVID M. PorrEit, THE IMPENDING CRISIS •• 1848-1861, at 346 (1976).
213 See id.
214 The Fourth Joint Debate at Charleston (Sept. 18, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DE-
BATES, supra note 205, at 189.
215 The Sixth Joint Debate, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 205, at 284.
216 ZAREFSKY, supra note 209, at 243.
t17 Id.
216 POTTER, supra note 212, at 346; GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG—THE
WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 97 (1992); ZAREFSKY, supra note 209, at 34-35,60-61,193—
94; see The First Joint Debate at Ottawa (Aug. 21, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES,
supra note 205, at 63; The Fourth Joint Debate, supra note 205, at 189; The Sixth Joint Debate,
supra note 205, at 284.
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conceded them all, while never allowing an essential point to slip
away.
Professor Nussbaum agrees that "the basic idea (of animal rights)
is to undo the regime of 'slavery' in which . . . animals now live, by the
simple recognition that they are persons and that their lives are their
own."219 Obtaining any legal rights for nonhuman animals in the pre-
sent legal system will require fighting from Lincoln's realizable mini-
mum. Lincoln believed the physical, historical, legal, religious, eco-
nomic, political, and psychological realities of the 1850s meant that
taking more than one step at a time for black slaves would keep them
enslaved. Today it means that advocating for too many rights for too
many nonhuman animals too soon will keep every nonhuman animal
enslaved.
D. Can We Protect Nonhuman Animals by Making Them Property?
Because I rely on the overarching values of Western jurispru-
dence, liberty and equality, and model the path toward basic legal
rights for nonhuman animals on that trodden by humans in their
struggle for civil rights, Judge Posner finds me just "another deer fro-
zen in the headlights of Brown v. Board of Education. '2" This demon-
strates, in Posner's view, "a sad poverty of imagination," one
that reflects the blinkered approach of the traditional lawyer,
afraid to acknowledge novelty and therefore unable to think
clearly about the reasons pro or con [for) a departure from
the legal status quo. It reflects also the extent to which lib-
eral lawyers remain in thrall to the constitutional jurispru-
dence of the Warren court and insensitive to the "liberating"
potential of commodification. One way to protect animals is
to make them property, because people tend to protect what
they °won
As was clear from Rattling the Cage, if frozen at all, it is in the head-
lights of its companiOn case, Bolling u Sharpe, not in Brown itself. 222
Not only did Bolling overrule Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal"
rule, but, in my opinion, it "exemplifie [d] how a sure grasp of princi-
219 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1548 (citations omitted).
220
 Posner, supra note 1, at 539.
221 Id.
222 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 497 (1954); Brown v. 11d, of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
483 (1954).
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ple. Moot v, ac ientilir tact. and the evolution of public morality can
lead judges to a volte-face lima a disgraceful series of rulings that
conllirt with a mote principled tradition."225
 That tradition was not
human chattel slavery, Jim Crow laws, and "separate but equal," but
the grander, more fundamental tradition of equality.
Appeal to fundamental principles at a high level of generality can
transcend constitutional jurisprudence; it is how the common law op-
erates. Lemuel Shaw, mid-nineteenth century Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, and probably the most re-
spected American state judge of his time, wrote the common law
"consists of a few broad and comprehensive principles, founded on
reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy, modified and
adapted to all the circumstances of the particular cases that fall within
it."224 Certainly that was what Lord Mansfield, perhaps the most re-
spected common law judge who ever lived, appealed to in Somerset v.
Stewart, his famous eighteenth century decision to free the slave,
James Somerset: "[t]he state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but
only [by] positive law.... It's so odious, that nothing can be suffered
to support it but positive law," 225
In Rattling the Cage, I bisected common law judges into those with
a Formal, and those with a Substantive, vision of law. 226 All Formal
judges rely , heavily on precedent, valuing past judicial decisions simply
for having been decided.227 I further divided Formal judges into three
categories.226 Precedent (Rules) Judges follow narrow legal rules be-
cause they value legal stability and certainty. 229 Precedent (Principles)
Judges also value stability and certainty, but believe that precedents set
forth broad principles, and it is these principles, and not the narrow
rules etched by particular applications, that they should follow. 2"
223 WISE, supra note 2, at 260; see Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 550-51 (1896). Between Brown and Bolling, the Justices
unanimously held that segregated schools violated both the liberty rights and equality
rights of black children. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
224 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. RR, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267 (1854).
225 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B. 1772).
225 See WISE, supra note 2, at 94-100.
2" See id. at 94-95.
228 Id. at 95-97.
229 Id. at 96.
350 See id. at 97.
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Precedent (Policy) Judges adhere to policies contained in prece-
dents. 231
On the other hand, Substantive Judges look not to the past, but
to the present or future. 232 Judges who value "goal reasons" and try to
predict the future effect of their decisions on society, I call Policy
Judges.233 Judges who value "rightness reasons" and find them em-
bedded not just in precedents, but in religion, ethics, economics, poli-
tics, almost anywhere, I call Principle Judges.234
The differences between Formal and Substantive Judges was well-
illustrated in the New York Times obituary of Lord Denning, one of the
purest Substantive Judges of the twentieth century. 235 One Substantive
lawyer admiringly noted that Denning had "steered the law towards
the administration of justice rather than the administration of the let-
ter of the law," while a Formal Lord Chancellor groused that u[t]he
trouble with Torn Denning is that he's always remaking the law, and
we never know where we are."236
Judge Posner disapproves of my argument that Formal Judges
grant basic legal rights to chimpanzees and bonobos as a matter of
precedent, because I rely upon argument from analogy. 257 Judge Pos-
ner is no Formal Judge. But arguing from analogy is how Formal
Judges decide cases. Today, most common law judges invoke princi-
ples, not rules, when fundamental rights are at stake. Because liberty
and equality are embedded in the common law (in the law of consti-
tutions and international instruments as well), Precedent (Principles)
Judges, arguing from analogy at a high level of generality, measure
the justice and moral rightness of their re-examination of the justice
of ancient legal rules, whether they involve legal thinghood of human
slaves or nonhuman animals, and construct new and more just legal
rules, and not just in the old ways. Because they almost always believe
in the moral rightness of liberty and equality, and believe that most
others believe it too, modern Principles Judges almost always ground
their decisions in these two basic principles.
231 See WISE, supra note 2, at 97.
222 Id.
233 Id. at 99.
"1 Id. at 99-100.
2" See Warren }loge, Lord Denning, 100, A Populist Who Enlivened British Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6,1999, at All.
23131d,
237
 Posner, supra note 1, at 533.
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That is how it should be. Legal personhood should never turn on
the mechanical operation of a narrow legal rule. No being should be
denied legal personhood because others like him or her were denied
them before or have always been denied them. This blindly perpetu-
ates the most pernicious and invidious biases of which we humans are
capable. Turning legal personhood on policy is as bad as linking it to
narrow rules of precedent. Fundamental rights are intended precisely
to protect a rights-holder from others, who might think that harming
him or her is either good for them or good for society. For example,
there are many reasons to support the argument that a woman should
have the legal right to an abortion. But when judges of the New York
Court of Appeals asserted in 1972 that the legal personhood of fetuses
was a policy question, they were wrong.238 As one dissenter rightly
complained, "[t]his argument was . . . made by Nazi lawyers and
Judges at Nuremberg."259 Connecting fundamental rights to policy
betrays the right, betrays the supplicant, and finally undermines the
rights of the betrayer.
A judge might hold that any being—a human adult, infant, or
fetus, a chimpanzee or a dog—should be a common law thing. But
such a momentous decision should be made only after a careful
weighing of the highest principles, for never does what is right more
clearly trump what is good or what has been than when legal person-
hood, from which every legal right flows, is itself at stake.
In arguing that principle should determine legal personhood, I
make no claim to objective truth. The evidence that judicial decisions
are saturated with a judge's values is overwhelming and the more con-
tentious the issue, the more influential those values will be. My argu-
ment—and I freely admit it is based on a value judgment—is this:
those judges who, like me, supremely value liberty, equality, and rea-
soned judgment, and who despise slavery and genocide, should be
prepared to analyze every claim for personhood, above all others,
through the prisms of fundamental principles. Judges who do not
share these values may analyze claims of basic rights in other ways.
Judge Posner is a famous Principles Judge, whose most basic
principles are economic. 240 Broadly, he argues "that the common law
238 Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 535 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (1972).
2'9 Id. at 397 (Burke, J., dissenting).
l 44 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-92 (1990)
thereinafter THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE], See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
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does and should seek to maximize society's wealth." 241
 He agrees that
wealth maximization, like its first cousin, utilitarianism, or national-
ism, Social Darwinism, or racialism,
treats people as if they were the cells of a single organism;
the welfare of the cell is important only insofar as it pro-
motes the welfare of the organism. Wealth maximization im-
plies that if the prosperity of the society can be promoted by
enslaving its least productive citizens, the sacrifice of their
freedom is worthwhile.242
Perhaps related is his discussion of "humanacentric concerns . . . one
which assigns no intrinsic value to animal welfare, but seeks reasons
strictly of human welfare for according or denying rights to ani-
mals... . . It focuses on the consequences far us of recognizing animal
rights."243
Judge Posner agrees that his touchstone principle, wealth maxi-
mization, "is contrary to the unshakable moral intuitions of Ameri-
cans," and stresses that "conformity to intuition is the ultimate test of
a moral (indeed of any) .theory. "244 "[A] t least in the present relatively
comfortable conditions of our society," he concedes, "the regard for
individual freedom appears to transcend instrumental considerations;
freedom appears to be valued for itself rather than just for its contri-
bution to prosperity."245 He makes the point that "a system of rights
. . . may well be required by a realistic conception of utilitarianism, that
is, one that understands that given the realities of human nature a
society dedicated to utilitarianism requires rules and institutions that
place checks on utility-maximizing behavior in particular cases." 246 It
appears, therefore, that in the realm of basic human rights, Judge
Posner allows that wealth maximization principle is trumped by lib-
erty and equality, even if he believes this should not be the case. 247
How can this be squared with Judge Posner's claim that, when it
comes to the enslavement of chimpanzees and bonobos, I have "over-
241 THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 240; at 361.
242 Id. at 576-77.
243 Posner, supra note 1, at 537. Judge Posner says he does not seek to defend the hu-
manocentric approach, but to explain it "because it is the approach most likely to recom-
mend itself to most people in wealthy, basically secular societies, such as the present-day
United States." Id.
244
 THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE. Afiina mite- 240. at 377.
245 td. at 379.
244i M. at 378.
2.17 See id. ai 379-80.
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looked the possibilities of commodification."248 It cannot. "One way,"
he claims, "to protect animals is to make them property, because peo-
ple tend to protect what they own. "249 But "[w]e speak of slavery as
degrading to persons because in slavery, individuals are valued as
mere commodities ... rather than as persons, worthy of the higher
valuation of respect.”258 A major lesson of our long experience with
human slavery is that, at the level of basic rights, there is no liberating
potential in commodification whatsoever and that humans are more
likely to exploit what they own than they are to protect it, especially if
they can obtain more of the commodity once they have used it up. We
continue to learn this hard lesson in the area of the environment.
In the United States, the commodification of nonhuman animals
leads to almost ten billion slaughtered annually for food, most of
them dying after living a terrible, painful life on a factory farm. 251
Each was owned and killed either by, or with the permission of, the
animal's owner. Tens of millions of nonhuman animals are consumed
annually in biomedical research in the United States. Each was owned
at the time of death and was also killed either by, or with the permis-
sion of, his owner. The benefits to them of commodification are
therefore hard to discern. Judge Posner's argument merely reiterates
Nozick's "utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people." 252
Even companion animals would not benefit from com-
modification, for their value to their owners is noneconomic and no-
nutilitarian. Otherwise, they would not be companion animals. Com-
panion animals are not fungible, as are nonhuman animals killed in
agriculture or biomedical research. At best, they have an incidental
economic or utilitarian value, for they are essentially family, quasi-
248
 Posner, supra note I, at 539.
249 Id.
288 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 71 (1993).
281 USDA, LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER 2000 SUMMARY 1 (2000). This includes 41.7 million
cattle and calves, 115.2 million pigs, 4.3 million sheep and lambs, 8.792 billion 'broiler'
chickens, 429.7 million laying hens, 304 million turkeys, and 26.1 million ducks, for a total
of 9.713 billion nonhuman animals.
Nozica, supra note 195, at 39. Here I rebut Professor Epstein's unusual claim that
animal rights activists often deny that human beings benefit from their current use (and
abuse) of animals. See Epstein, supra note 58, at 34. Slave-owners always benefit from the
use (and abuse) of slaves.
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children 455 They may even be metaphorical extensions of the human
companions themselves. 254
Thus, one reason I appear insensitive to the "liberating" potential
of commodification of nonhuman animals is that it does not exist.
Another reason is that a main purpose of Rattling the Cage was to dem-
onstrate that the argument for the basic legal rights of at least some
nonhuman animals lies squarely in the mainstream of the most im-
portant traditional common law values and principles. This is untrue
at the level of specific legal rules. Here Judge Posner is correct: I am
asking judges to step onto a new path of doctrinal growth—giving
nonhuman animals basic legal rights.
Precedent (Rules) Judges will be unimpressed. But viewed at a
higher level of generality, I am not asking judges to do anything they
have not been routinely doing for centuries and which they consider
to be important work, protecting bodily integrity and bodily liberty by
applying fundamental principles of liberty and equality. As I stated in
Rattling the Cage:
The decision to extend common law personhood to chim-
panzees and bonobos will arise from a great common law
case. Great common law cases are produced when great
common law judges radically restructure existing precedent
in ways that reaffirm bedrock principles and policies. All the
tools for deciding such a case exist. They await a great com-
mon law judge, a Mansfield, a Cardozo, a Holmes, to take
them up and set to work. 255
E. Legal Rights and Personhood
1. What Are Legal Rights?
What nonlawyers think of as one legal right is usually a bundle.
Professor Wesley Hohfeld untied these bundles a century ago. 256 I
253 Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society,
and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 44-
50 (1998).
254
 See id. at 67-68.
255 WISE, supra note 2, at 270.
256 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING 64 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919); see W.L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN
164-65 (1982); Walter J. Kamba, Legal Theory and Hohfeld's Ana lysis of a Legal Right, Jump.
ibitilrng the Cagr 1 irfribrIrri	 (169
1.1..4% legal light% the way Holifeld did. Aldunigh moral and legal
hale night► iii• legal rights in numerous ways,
Holdeld's s% dent:
remains both the lingua franca of much scholarly rights talk
and the "standard model" of legal rights with which other
scholars tinker. In whole or in part, it was adopted by various
Restatements of the Law, as well as by Black's Law Dictionary.
Most importantly, Hohfeld's sense of a right as something
that confers legal advantage expressly or implicitly domi-
nates the working world of even those lawyers and judges
who have never heard of Hohfeld. 257
Hohfeld thought every jural relationship was binary, existing be-
tween two legal persons concerning one thing.258 A right is an advan-
tage conferred by legal rules upon a legal person with one legal per-
son having the legal advantage (the right) and the other legal person
bearing the correlative legal disadvantage. 259 Like low and high pres-
sure systems on a weather map, neither exists alone and Hohfeld
defined them in relation to each other. 26°
Hohfeld set out four kinds of legal rights, each defined in terms
of its correlative. 261 The "liberty" (which correlates with "no right")
allows us do what we please, but has little practical value because no
one need respect the right. 262 The second is the "claim" (which corre-
lates with the duty) . 265 It commands respect and can constrain liberty
because one person has a duty to act or not in certain ways towards
another person with a claim. 284 Many hostile to the idea of "animal
rights"—even those within the scientific community who know how
smart and cultured apes are—assert apes cannot have legal rights be-
cause they are unable to shoulder responsibilities or, even more strin-
REV. 249, 249 (1974); Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurispru-
dence fium Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L REV. 975, 989 n.22 (1982).
2" Wise, supra note 111, at 800-01; see WISE, supra note 2, at 53-61.
2ss See SUMNER, supra note 152, at 19-20; WIsE, supra note 2, at 53.
239 See David Lyons, The Correlativily of Rights and Duties, 4 NoOs 45-46 (1970).
26° See Wise, supra note 111, at 799-822 (discussing Hohfeld's system of rights).
261 REX MARTIN, A SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 30 (1993).
"2 See id.
"3 See id.
264 HOHFELD, supra note 256, at 38-39.
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gently, live within a moral community. 265 I discussed this in Rattling the
Cage.
Must a person be able to physically make a claim in order
to have one? The answer depends upon whether one empha-
sizes the "claim" part or the "duty" part of the claim-duty
pairing. One school of legal scholars (we'll call them the
Benefit/Interest School) emphasizes "duty." Any being with
interests—an adult woman, a profoundly retarded man, an
infant, a chimpanzee, or a dolphin—could, if allowed to be a
legal person, have a claim that correlates to another person's
duty. The opposing school (the Control/Choice School) ac-
cents "claims." These scholars argue that a person must ac-
tually have the mental wherewithal to be able to choose to
make a claim and to control how it is made. 266 Profoundly
retarded men and infants, who lack these mental abilities,
cannot then have claims. An even stricter branch of the Con-
trol/Choice School ... says that claims and duties can only
exist between members of a "moral community." Unless one
has the capacity not just to choose but to act morally, one
can have no claims,
If required to meet the more stringent requirements of
the Strict Control/Choicers, none but the most extraordi-
nary nonhuman animal could ever have a claim. But here's
the rub: Millions of human beings would also be ineligible—
and not just the profoundly retarded, but the insane, the
permanently vegetative, and the very young. Many more
human adults and older children, and perhaps even apes,
whales, and parrots, might have claims if the Control/
Choice School prevailed. But vast numbers of human beings
would still be ineligible, as would most other animals. How-
ever, if the Benefit/Interest School triumphs, aside from the
permanently vegetative, virtually every human being would
26' See FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED! THE ORIGINS OF. RIGHT AND WRONG IN HU-
MANS AND OTHER ANIMALS 215 (1996); D. Balasubramanian, Are Animals Persons?, THE
HINDU, Dec. 7, 2000, available at http://www.indiaserver.com:80/thehindu/2000/12/07/
stories/08070007.htm; Frans de Waal, Editorial, We the People (and Other Animals) . ,
Tints, Aug. 20, 1999, at A21; Hutchins, supra note 53, at 856; Linker, supra note 199, at 43;
Malik, supra note 106, at 675-76.
266 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 166, at 171, 191-92, 196-97.
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be entitled to claims; but so would a large number of other
animals. 267
Advocates of the Control/Choice and Strict Control/Choice
Schools are kin to Kantians who demand full autonomy for liberty
rights. Benefit/Interest advocates are much closer to the realistic or
practical autonomy that I argue is sufficient for basic legal rights.
However, to be conservative in Rattling the Cage, I did not argue that
nonhuman animals are entitled to claims.
In Hohfeld's third class of legal rights, a person can use a
"power" (which correlates with the "liability") to affect another's legal
rights, with the power to sue perhaps the most important. 2" It is not
clear whether someone has to be smart enough to assert a power in
order to have it. They probably do not. Again, to be conservative, I
did not argue that nonhuman animals are entitled to powers. 269 Last,
an "immunity" (which correlates with the disability) legally disables
another person from interfering with the rights-holder. 27° Claims dic-
tate what we should not legally do, immunities dictate what we cannot
legally do. 271 I may kidnap you, but I cannot enslave you because hu-
man bondage is "impossible" under domestic and international law.
Persons are immune from enslavement. 272
I did not argue that chimpanzees and bonobos necessarily have
claims against humans for violation of duties toward them or the
power to sue, though I implied they should. 273
 But rational arguments
cannot be made that someone must be smart enough to assert an
immunity, or be able to choose, control, or shoulder responsibilities
to have an immunity, as immunities do not need to be asserted,
claimed, or controlled; nor do they correlate with responsibilities or
duties. 274 Immunities as freedom from slavery and torture are the
most basic kind of rights and it is these to which chimpanzees and
bonobos, like human beings, are most clearly entitled. 275 The nature
267 WISE, SUM note 2, at 57.
265 See Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equip., Inc., 89 F.3d 574, 578 (9th Cir.
1996) (quoting JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 59 (1990)); PJ. Frrz-
GERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 229-30 (12th ed. 1966).
269 I implied, however, that they should have these rights. WISE, supra note 2, at 59-60.
270 Kamba, supra note 256, at 257.
"I SUMNER, supra note 152, at 37-38.
"2 United States v. Choctaw Nation, 38 Ct. Cl. 558, 566 (1903), affd, 193 U.S. 115
(1903); see MARTIN, supra note 261, at 30.
273 WISE, supra note 2, at 56-57, 59-60.
274 See id. at 59.
275 See id.
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of immunities insulates them from the struggle between Con-
trol/Choice Theory and Benefit/Interest Theory that characterizes
claim-rights and power-rights. Even prominent Control/Choice Theo-
rists concede that immunity-rights shield "certain freedoms and
benefits now regarded as essentials of human well-being" and are "es-
sential for the maintenance of the life, the security, the development,
and the dignity of the individual."276 Critics who argue that legal
rights require responsibilities, duties, or the abilities to choose or con-
trol fail to grasp the essence of an immunity-right or explain how the
millions of humans—children, infants, the very retarded, the pro-
foundly senile—who lack these advanced cognitive skills can have
immunity rights. And though the occasional commentator admits
what Professor Carl Wellman calls that "monstrous conclusion"—
those who lack the ability to choose or control are not entitled to legal
rights—most do not. 277
"Why does the law provide protection for children—and for the
mentally disabled, who also might not be rational and autonomous—
but not for apes?," asked journalist Kenan Malik in Nature. His answer:
ecause children normally grow up to be full members of
the moral community. . . . As for mentally disabled people,
we provide them protections because they once possessed
the potential to be a moral being. Children and the mentally
handicapped are of the same kind as adult, autonomous
humans: the kind whose normal instance is a moral being.
Apes are not.278
Malik's argument is illogical. Homo sapiens cannot rationally be
designated as the boundary of any relevant "kind" that includes every
fully autonomous human. Other "kinds" exist. Some are broader—
great apes, apes, primates, mammals, vertebrates, and animals. Some
"kinds" are more narrow. The categories of adult humans and normal
adult humans also contain every autonomous moral human.
Malik's claim of group benefits is also morally flawed. Philoso-
pher James Rachels has pointed out that it "assumes that we should
determine how an individual is to be treated, not on the basis of its
qualities but on the basis of other individual's qualities."279 Even Pro-
276 H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OxFoRn ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 171,
197, 198 (A.W.E. Simpson ed., 1973); SetWELLMAN, supra note 166, at 113.
277 WELLMAN, supra note 166, at 113-14; see, e.g., Malik, supra note 106, at 676.
VI Malik, supra note 106, at 676.
279 RACHELS, supra note 177, at 187.
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fessor Tribe, who supports racial and sexual affirmative action, has
acknowledged the "tenaciously-held principle . . . with undeniable
constitutional roots . . . that each 'person should be treated as an indi-
vidual rather than as a statistic or as a member of a group—particu-
larly of a group the individual did not knowingly choose to join,"280
This does not mean that racial or sexual affirmative action is al-
ways wrong or should be illegal. Something like Malik's notion of
group benefits is occasionally used to correct the effects of prior dis-
crimination in the United States. Even so, judges often manifest what
Professor Tribe called a "considerable unease" in sharply divided en-
dorsements of affirmative action, plans. 281 Judges are not alone. In a
New York Times/CBS poll taken at the end of 1997, 25% of Americans
wished to abolish affirmative action programs outright, 0% wanted
them changed, and just 24% wanted to leave them as they are. 282
About the constitutionality of conclusive presumptions, Professor
Tribe wrote:
In fact, our laws and traditions do not typically condemn
regulations that automatically group together everyone who
violates some flat rule, like, everyone who goes above the
posted speed limit, regardless of individual circum-
stances. . . . In the same way, our laws and traditions don't
condemn a college for giving group preferences to alumni
children, or to kids from Alaska in a Missouri school that
prizes geographical diversity..Our laws and traditions don't
condemn a state for setting a drinking age of twenty-one
without allowing exceptions for unusually mature twenty-
year-olds. When Steve [Wise], who condemns assigning
rights purely on the bksis of where the group we call "hu-
man" begins and ends, would extend rights to chimps and
bonobos as kinds of beings about which he has adduced im-
pressive evidence relevant to the group as a whole, he
wouldn't administer a battery of IQ tests to each individual
chimp before declaring it eligible for those newly pro-
2" TRIBE, supra note 108, at 1527-28, 1589.
281 See, e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996); TRIBE, supra note 108, at
1523.
2" Sam Howe Verhovek, In Poll, Americans Reject Means But Not Ends of Racial Diversity,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at Al.
674	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 43:623
claimed rights. He, like all of us, would make decisions on a
group basis even as he purports to condemn doing S0.285
But our values and traditions do condemn the turning of fundamen-
tal rights, even personhood itself, upon some status such as race, sex,
religion, or national origin in the absence of some powerful reason, as
they condemn serious incursions upon dignity or fundamental inter-
ests, as well as invidious discrimination against the traditionally power-
less.284
 Our laws and traditions do not tolerate setting different drink-
ing ages for men and women, permitting colleges to give group
preferences to whites over blacks, or condemning only Jews who go
over the speed limit.
Contrary to Professor Tribe's belief, practical autonomy entitles
individuals, not groups, to basic legal rights. Strictly speaking, indi-
vidual results are anecdotes; the results cannot be generalized to
other species members. But, as comparative psychologist Marc Hauser
notes:
[T]here are anecdotes and there are anecdotes. For exam-
ple, Jane Goodall provides a detailed account of the mur-
derous attacks by Passion [a chimpanzee] on all of Porn's
[another chimpanzee's] infants. This is a single case study of
chimpanzee brutality, but the details are extensive. In this
sense, many of the cases of deception from captive apes
come from detailed observations of a single animal over
years and years of observation. Rejecting these single cases
would be like ignoring someone who announced that they
[sic] had a dog who could write computer code in Pascal, C,
and Fortran. One would be foolish to ask for twenty more
dogs in order to seal the case shutl One case shows that a
capacity exists in the sFiecies. 285
Professor Irene Pepperberg, acclaimed for her linguistic work with
Alex, an African Grey parrot, agrees: "If one subject reliably performs
a given task at a particular age, the tested aptitude is within the spe-
cies' capacity at that point in development. "286 That so many ran-
domly chosen chimpanzees and bonobos have been shown so clearly
285 Tribe, supra note 75, at 6.
254 SeellusE, supra note 108, at 1451-54,1463-65,1514-21.
4B5 MARC D. HAUSER, WILD MINDS-WHAT ANIMALS REALLY THINK 159 (2000).
"6 IRENE PEPPERBERG, THE ALEX STUDIES-COGNITIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE ABILI-
TIES OF GREY PARROTS 184 (1999).
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to have practical autonomy is a powerful indicator that every normal
chimpanzee has it. But to the degree that practical autonomy is neces-
sary for basic legal rights, one who lacks it is not entitled.
Elsewhere, Professor Tribe has written that:
to tailor all determinations to the individual case would be to
encourage arbitrary choices, choices that depart from the
goal of treating similar cases similarly, and choices that could
well conceal substantively impermissible grounds of decision.
This much, at least, the notions of "suspect classifications"
and "conclusive presumptions" have in common: both seem
easiest to apply when the issue involves the exercise of a right
we have come to regard as constitutionally "fundamental,"
such as the right to bodily integrity. . . . And conclusive pre-
sumptions need not be abandoned wholesale in order to
concede that readily disprovable generalizations about chil-
dren . . . cannot suffice to justify what would, absent the fact
of childhood, constitute an action beyond the power of the
state. 287
Human newborns have legal rights. More controversially, fetuses, even
ova, have rights in some American states. 288
 This may result from the
legal fiction that they are autonomous; or it might result from the ap-
plication of another sufficient condition for basic rights, even one,
such as being human, resulting from arbitrariness or bias; or it might
have something to do with autonomy. A being may not be autono-
mous, but she may be believed to have the potential for autonomy,
and if she has that potential, she should be treated as if she were
autonomous now
Potential for autonomy, however, justifies treating one who lacks
autonomy as if she does not no more (and probably less) than does
the fact that one's potential for dying justifies treating her as if she
were dead or one's potential for attaining the age of eighteen justifies
treating a three-year old as if she has reached majority. 289 Philosopher
Joel Feinberg thinks that allocating rights based on potential is a logi-
cal error. 290
 Potential autonomy gives rise only to potential rights. Ac-
287 TRIBE, supra note 108, at 1589-90.
sea Wise, supra note 111, at 897.
2" ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 359 (1991).
290 SeeJoel Feinberg, Potentiality, Development, and Rights, in Ti IE PROBLEM OF ABORTION
145 ( Joel Feinberg ed., 2d ed., Wadsworth Publishing 1984).
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tual autonomy gives rise to actual rights. 291 For example, any thirty-five
year-old American-born citizen,is a potential president of the United
States. As philosopher Stanley Benn wrote, "A potential president of
the United States is not on that account Commander-in-Chief. "292
Every sperm and every ovum can potentially unite to make a presi-
dent of the United States. 293 Even the potentiality argument fails to
explain why the common law would grant basic human rights to adult
humans who never had autonomy and never will.
Any single right I call a "bare right." Bare rights protected by
other legal rights that may be judicially unenforceable I call "pro-
tected rights." A right enforceable by a court I call an "enforceable
right." A bare negative liberty-right, say to bodily integrity, is not pro-
tected until embedded within an immunity-right or associated with a
claim-right to noninterference. It is not enforceable until associated
with a power-right to judicial enforcement. Most modern rights analy-
ses therefore assume that a liberty-right requires a set of Hohfeldian
rights to be of practical value. 294
Protected and enforceable rights are, in Professor L.W. Sumner's
term, "molecular,"295 appearing as "conjunctions" of Hohfeldian
rights, using Professor John Finnis's term,296 or as "cluster-rights," in
Professor Judith Jarvis-Thomson's words. Professor Wellman has per-
suasively argued that a protected or enforceable right has a "core"
that "defines both its content (what it is a right to) and its scope (who
holds the right against whom). . . . The periphery of a right is then
composed of any further ingredients which are added in order to en-
hance or protect its core."297 Molecules, conjunctions, clusters, and
peripheries are all metaphors for protected and enforceable rights.
291 Id. at 145; see H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 143
(1986).
292 Stanley I. Benn, Abortion, Infanticide, and Respect for Persons, in THE PROBLEM OF
ABORTION, supra note 290, at 143.
293 See JEFFREY REIMAN, ABORTION AND THE WAYS WE VALUE HUMAN LIFE 63-64
(1999).
294 See In re Farmers Mkts.,.Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986); Standard Oil Co.
v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917, 930 (2d Cir. 1947); Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 137 Cal. Rptr.
797, 801 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); SUMNER, supra note 152, at 48; WELLMAN, supra note
166, at 7-8, 81, 108-09; Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to THEORIES OF RIGHTS 8 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984).
295 SUMNER, supra note 152, at 19,
296 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 200-01 (1980).
497 SUMNER, supra note 152, at 48; see WELLMAN, supra note 166, at 7-8.
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But perhaps Hart's notion of a "protective perimeter" around core
rights is most evocative."8
The legal rights to bodily integrity and bodily liberty are basic
Hohfeldian immunities that disable others from legally interfering
with liberty. An immunity is a bare or core right, unprotected and un-
enforceable. But even a bare immunity has value. In some circum-
stances it can be vindicated by others who clearly possess legal rights,
as occurred in the famous case of Somerset v. Stewart, in which English
citizens were able to vindicate the right to bodily liberty of the slave,
James Somerset, by obtaining a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf.
Most citizens will respect important rights of others. Even an unen-
forceable immunity has great symbolic or expressive value. And
judges may give the holder of an immunity the power to sue to enjoin
its violation.299
2. Why Not Just Extend and Vigorously Enforce Anti-Cruelty and
Animal Welfare Laws?
a. The Power of Legal Rights
In Rattling the Cage, I wrote that legal rights are "the least porous
barrier against oppression and abuse that humans have ever devised
.."300 Because "innate rights provide stronger protections against
abuse than the traditional noblesse oblige of welfare theory,"° 1 I ar-
gued that chimpanzees and bonobos should be designated com-
mon-law persons with basic rights to bodily integrity and bodily lib-
erty.302 Judge Posner accuses me of
overlook[ing] not only the possibilities of commodification,
but also, and less excusably, an approach to the question of
animal welfare that is more conservative, methodologically
as well as politically, but possibly more efficacious, than
rights-mongering. That is simply to extend, and more vigor-
298
 Hart, supra note 276, at 180.
299 WISE, supra note 2, at 59; see Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
300
 WISE, supra note 2, at 236.
"I Verchick, supra note 103, at 222.
992 See WISE, supra note 2, at 239-65. 1 did not argue, as some have written, that chim-
panzees and bonobos are entitled to constitutional rights. But see, e.g., Posner, supra note 1,
at 531, 539.
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ously to enforce, laws designed to prevent gratuitous cruelty
to animals.'"
A monger is a person "who attempts to stir up or spread something
that is usu [ally] petty or discreditable." 304 Should we forsake the alleg-
edly discreditable or petty argument that chimpanzees and bonobos
should have basic legal rights and work instead to extend, strengthen,
and enforce anti-cruelty and animal welfare laws?
Judge Posner is not alone in questioning my decision to push for
legal rights, rather than the mere extension and vigorous enforce-
ment of existing anti-cruelty and animal welfare laws. Professor Nuss-
baum wrote,
Oddly, Wise does not explore other ways in which the stat-
utes against animal cruelty that currently exist in every state
might be both extended and better enforced, for example,
by developing a better view of the conditions under which
human beings have standing to sue in court to enforce these
laws.3"
Lt. Commander Conrad wrote that
if the current animal welfare laws are inadequate the solu-
tion is not to create instant fundamental rights, but to
strengthen the current laws by more vigorously pursuing vio-
lations and increasing punishments. . . . We need to enforce
existing laws better and we need to improve on those laws
where they are deficient. 3"
Attorney Lisa Stansky asked, "How is legal personhood for animals
more powerful than vigorous enforcement or legislative overhaul of
anti-cruelty laws?"307
Why "animal rights" rather than "animal welfare?" Professor Ver-
chick likens the tension between the two to that which existed be-
tween the early and present Critical Legal Studies movement. 3" As
with the early Critical Legal Studies movement, animal welfarism "dis-
trusts rights rhetoric and strives for connection. For the welfarist, love
303
 Posner, supra note 1, at 539.
3°4
 MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 766 (9th ed. 1991).
305 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1547.
308 Conrad, supra note 97, at 231.
307 Stansky, supra note 11, at 95.
308 Verchick, supra note 103, at 221-22.
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more than respect motivates us to care about nonhuman interests." 509
Professor Verchick warns, "One must not underestimate the power of
legal rights in a democracy."31° Rights demand respect. He approves
Professor Patricia Williams's charge that It] his country's worst his-
torical moments have not been attributable to rights-assertion, but to a
failure of rights-commitment. From this perspective, the problem with
rights discourse is not that the discourse is itself constricting, but that
it exists in a constricted referential universe:111 "The worst thing
about rights, then," Verchick asserts, "is that there are not enough of
them :112
Professor Tribe agrees that legal rights are very important:
[E]ven when the assignment of rights to new entities is
widely regarded as only a legal fiction—we all know the cor-
poration isn't really a person—even when it's widely regarded
as just a fiction, that assignment of rights can make a vast dif-
ference . . . in the real world. . . . Existing state and federal
statutes depend on enforcement by chronically
underfunded agencies and by directly affected and highly
motivated people—and that's just not a sufficiently reliable
source of protection. Recognizing the animals themselves by
statute as holders of rights would mean that they could sue
in their own name and in their own right. . .. Guardians
would ultimately have to be appointed to speak for these
voiceless rights-holders, just as guardians are appointed
today for infants, or for the profoundly retarded, or for
elderly people with advanced Alzheimer's, or for the
comatose. But giving animals this sort of "virtual voice"
would go a long way toward strengthening the protection
they receive under existing laws . . . . 313
Professor Nussbaum also notes,
[O]ne thing gained by using Wise's [rights-based] approach
is moral directness. . . . Standing for humans to sue on be-
half of animals has typically taken an indirect form: the hu-
man being has to claim to have an interest in looking at an
3°9
 Id. at 222.
MO Id. at 224.
Oil Id. at 222 (quoting Patricia .). Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from De-
constructed Rights, 22 H*nv. C.R.-C.L. L. REAP. 401, 424 (1987)).
312 Id.
317 Tribe, supra note 75, at 3.
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animal who has not been cruelly used. The rights-based view
is morally superior, in that it focuses on the creature itself
and in its own entitlement to a decent life. 314
b. The Relationship Among Legal Rights, Legal Personhood, and Animal
Welfare Laws
In his review of Rattling the Cage, Professor Cass Sunstein thought
it was "not clear why [Wise] needs to insist on 'personhood' for non-
human animals."315 Nonhuman animals, he believes, already have le-
gal rights.316 "In most states, it is usually a crime to abuse animals, and
the legal right to be free from abuse often includes affirmative rights,
including the right to adequate food and shelter. "917 Subsequently,
Sunstein wrote that "(firorti the legal point of view, there is nothing at
all new or unfamiliar about the idea of animal rights; on the contrary,
it is entirely clear that animals have legal rights, at least of a certain
kind,"318 that "[s]tatutes protecting animal welfare protect a form of
animal rights,"319 that "it would not be too much to say that federal
and state law now guarantees a robust set of animal rights, at least
nominally,"320 and that "animals have rights in the same sense that
people have many rights that they cannot enforce on their own. "321
Contrary to Hohfeld's understanding of legal rights, Professor Sun-
stein thinks it unnecessary for nonhuman animals to be legal persons
to have rights. 322 This follows from his pragmatic view of rights as "an
enforceable claim of one kind or another," also contrary to Hohfeld's
view. 323
 As Sunstein has written,
Any right has a range of components: (1) a substantive guar-
antee of some specified kind, often in the form of a pre-
sumptive immunity or guarantee; (2) powers of enforce-
ment, perhaps limited to public authorities, perhaps
extended to private right holders as well; (3) defenses and
$14 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 1547 n.151 (citations omitted).
315 Cass R. Sunstein, The Chimps' Day in Court: A Lawyer Argues that Animals Should Have
Legal Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000 (Book Review), at 26.
316 1d.
30 Id.
315 Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1333, 1335 (2000).
515 Id. at 1335 n.9.
325 Id. at 1336.
321 Id. at 1337 n.16.
322 See id. at 1365.
323 Sunstein, supra note 318, at 1363.
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excuses of rights violators, and (4) resources, large or small,
devoted to rights pro tection. 324
Sunstein gives the example that, before the American Civil War, black
slaves were not considered persons, yet could bring suits: "Mn par-
ticular, slaves were allowed to bring suit . . to challenge unjust servi-
tude. "525
These so-called freedom suits, generally authorized by state stat-
utes, allowed slaves to test the legality of their enslavement. 526 Legisla-
tures were anxious to provide a judicial forum in which illegally-
enslaved whites (sometimes Indians) might prove the illegality of
their enslavement. 327 The important point is that freedom suits were
not intended to allow the lawfully-enslaved to challenge to their en-
slavement, but to permit the illegally-enslaved to demonstrate this il-
legality. Freedom suits were similar to habeas corpus actions, but
could be brought by the slave, his guardian, or next friend. 325 The
statutes generally assumed that slaves remained legal things with no
legal rights, including the power-right to bring suit. 526 These statutes
allowed slaves to file avowedly fictitious suits for trespass, false impris-
onment, and assault and battery, while pretending the slaves were not
slaves for that single purpose. 55° This was the route used by Dred Scott
in his original Missouri state lawsuit."'
Under Sunstein's definition, not only chimpanzees and bonobos
have legal rights, but individuals belonging to many thousands of
animal species as well. So do thousands of plants. The Federal Endan-
gered Species Act, for example, defines "species" to include "any sub-
species of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population seg-
ment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds
when mature," and broadly allows citizen suits to enforce the Act
354 Id. at 1335.
345 Id. at 1361.
5" See Higginbotham & Higginbotham, supra note 88, at 1234-35.
5" See id.
50 See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR—RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 194-95,252-.53 (1978); Higginbotham
& Higginbotham, supra note 88, at 1235 n.125.
3" See Higginbotham & Higginbotham; supra note 88, at 1234,
33° Id. at 1234-36 (discussing the Virginia Freedom Suit. Act of 1795); HIGGINBOTHAM,
supra note 328, at 194-95 (South Carolina), 252-53 (Georgia); see Peter; 1848 WL 2754, at
*1; Coleman v. Dick & Pat, 3 Va. (1 Wash) 233, available at 1793 WL 378, *5 (Va. 1793);
Si lAw, supra note 78, at 110 ("Briefly, and for the purpose of the trial, lie could assume the
guise of a free man.").
331 Scotty. Emerson, 15 Mo. 387,395 (1852).
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against illegal takings.352 In Sunstein's view, endangered plants would
therefore have legal rights. Even inanimate objects such as buildings
would have rights to the extent they were protected by law.
Legal personhood is "unquestionably central to American legal
culture."333 "[E]roadly, . the law of the person raises the fundamen-
tal question of who counts for the purpose of law" and "is closely tied
to moral and ethical considerations.""4 I venture that legal rights are
actually the building blocks of legal personality; without them there is
no personhood. If I am correct, a "rightless person" is an oxymoron.
That is certainly true in the Hohfeldian system of legal rights in which
every jural relationship is constructed from a bare right and its cor-
relative, and is, by definition, between two persons 9 35
The human rights scholar Professor Louis Henkin wrote:
In part, the concept of right is descriptive: jurisprudence
(and language) developed it to describe legal relations, im-
plying special entitlement, respected by the society with a
sense of obligation, and generally enjoyed by the right-
holder in fact. In large part, the concept of right is norma-
tive: a society develops the notion that someone has a legal
right to something in order to assure, or at least enhance the
likelihood, that he or she will enjoy it in fact. Recognizing
that a claim is valid, giving it legal status as a right, itself con-
tributes to the likelihood that it will be enjoyed in facts"
A serious concern with the idea of rights without personhood is that it
depreciates the importance, even the symbolism, of rights. Legal per-
sonhood counts because legal persons have rights. Legal persons
count in some fundamental way. If every inanimate object and ani-
mate being who is the subject of legal protection has legal rights, they
are stripped of the power and protection of its powerful expressive
function; rights no longer symbolize something worth fighting, even
dying, for. Rights are reduced to a public declaration that a legislature
333 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (16) (2000).
333 Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1746
(2001),
334 Id, at 1746, 1762.
335 Ar111111 I.. Corbin. (..Xul .irruhtiil aap41	 etoluo,	 1,1 A I.	 I	 I II" i' 4 -:4 )!.
Kamba, supra note 254i, al 251.
313 Lou Is 1 IENKIN.	 AGE Uk Rit.11 Is 38 ill.0.010).
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or court has decided to protect a building or a plant or an animal for
any number of reasons."7
Judge Posner appears more likely to turn his scorn on Professor
Sunstein's argument for legal rights than on mine. If he thinks that
"No be told now that slaves had rights is an example of how the
movement for animal rights can depreciate human rights," what must
he think of Professor Sunstein's argument for rights without person-
hood with rights being synonymous with some protection of law,
which American slaves clearly had? 358
Professor Tribe warns, "[Me should not obsess over legal rights,"
for "rights are not all they are sometimes cracked up to be."339 Rights
may be overridden or ineffectual, he writes, and "UN you lost the
status of holding constitutional rights, it does not necessarily follow
that you are going to be reduced to a thing." 34° Law, he argues, "some-
times confers protections by identifying and prohibiting wrongs,
rather than by bestowing rights, and it can prohibit those wrongs in
terms that are sweeping enough to provide a shield that is independ-
ent of who or what the immediate victim of the wrong happens to
be."341 He notes, for example, that in one case, the United States Su-
preme Court wrote, "[I] t's not really material whether banks 'have'
free speech rights under the Constitution, because the Constitution
protects freedom of speech, not just the speakee342
And in exactly the same way, if chimps and gorillas, for ex-
ample, were deemed to possess no First Amendment rights
of their own, the First Amendment would still ban govern-
ment suppression of supposedly indecent sign language by
these apes—at least if the sign language were directed to
human listeners or observers. Similarly, the Eighth Amend-
ment to the Constitution forbids all cruel and unusual pun-
ishments. Nothing is said about who is being punished. The
language at least seems rather well-suited to the problem of
cruelty to animals, although I wouldn't expect any of our
current judges or justices to construe the language that gen-
erously. Best suited of all, the Thirteenth Amendment, which
337
 See Cats R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Laz4 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,2044—
48 (1996).
338 Posner, supra note 1, at 538; see SHAW, supra note 78, at 160.
3" Tribe, supra note 75, at 3.
34° Id.
341 Id. at 3-4.
343 Id. at, 4. The case was First National Bank v. Bolivia, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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prohibits slavery throughout the United States and which is
not limited to government violations but extends to private
conduct as well, simply says "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude shall exist in the United States." Clearly, Jerom
[the chimpanzee whose story of torture and death with
which I began Ratting the Cage] was enslaved. I am not sug-
gesting that today's judges would so read the Thirteenth
Amendment; I am simply pointing out that our constitu-
tional apparatus and tradition includes devices for protect-
ing values even without taking the step of conferring rights
on new entities—by identifying certain things that are simply
wrong.343
Professor Tribe has also written, "Human beings are of course the
intended beneficiaries of our constitutional scheme. "344 The fetus ex-
emplifies what happens when a being is denied the status of a federal
constitutional person. This occurred in Rae v. Wade, where the United
States Supreme Court said that a fetus was not a "person" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. 545 The Court did not state this made the fetus a thing.s" But it
could be destroyed. 347
The Supreme Court of Texas has held that a fetus is not a "per-
son" under the Texas Wrongful Death Act or Survival Statute.'" But
the court's entire explanation for its rejection of the mother's alterna-
tive demand for damages for the destruction of her chattel was the
statement, "[W]e hold as a matter of law, that a fetus is not relegated
to the status of chattel."349 The upshot was that, in Texas, a fetus could
be killed with civil impunity. 350 And if a Texas fetus is neither person
nor thing, what is it? And what of a preembryo, the term for a zygote
until fourteen days after fertilization? The Tennessee Supreme Court
held both that a trial court erred in holding that preembryos were
persons and the Appellate Court erred in assuming they were prop-
343 Tribe, supra note 75, at 4 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIII).
344
 Tribe, supra note 75, at 108.
I* See 410 U.S. 113,159-62 (1973).
346 See id.
547 See id. at 164-65.
348 See Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distrib., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504-06 (Tex. 1987).
349 Id. at 506.
"0 See id
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erty.551 Preembryos "occupy an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life;" but the par-
ties had "an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that
they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the
preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law." 552 It is not clear
how this "interest in the nature of ownership" differs from a regular
property interest. To the extent that a court holds that a being is not a
person, it can be treated as a thing.
In the bank free speech case, somebody had rights! If the bank
lacked the right to free speech, then a person in an audience had a
right to receive speech, and the bank certainly had the power-right to
bring the lawsuit. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition is generally
limited to criminal punishments, which nonhuman animals are un-
likely to suffer.555 The same goes for the signing ape. She might not
have the free speech right to produce language, but some person has
the right to receive it and some person has the right to bring suit. The
Thirteenth Amendment states that "[n] either abolition of slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States . ."354 In The Slaughter-House Cases, the United States Supreme
Court called it "this grand yet simple declaration of the personal free-
dom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this govern-
ment."55 Later, the Court said that "in Webster 'slavery' is defined as
'the state of entire subjugation of one person to the will of another.'" 556
Whether the Court has incorporated the requirement of personhood
into the Thirteenth Amendment or not, in the only reported case in
which it was claimed the Amendment applied to a nonhuman, the
Im Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). "It follows that any interest that
[the parties] have in the preembryos ... is not a true property interest." Id. at 597; cf. LA.
}Inv. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West 2000) ("An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridi-
cal person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at
any other time when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with law."); id. at
§ 9:124 (an in vitro fertilized human ovum has the right to sue and be sued); id. at § 9:126
(allowing a court to appoint a curator "to protect the in vitro fertilized human ovum's
rights"); id at § 9:129 (forbidding the intentional destruction of an in vitro fertilized hu-
man ovum).
552 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
553 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1977).
554 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
"5 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872) (emphasis added).
555
 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (emphasis added).
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Florida Supreme Court concluded, without explanation, that it did
not, because a greyhound was not a uparty.”557
c. Are Legal Rights a Zero Sum Game and Is That a Bad Thing?
Technically, legal rights may be a zero sum game. A master's
rights are diminished whenever slavery, human or nonhuman, is abol-
ished, while the slave's 'rights are increased. Is that a bad thing? The
answer turns on a value judgment of the importance of the rights be-
ing given and those taken away. I believe the extension of dignity-
rights to every being qualified to receive them strengthens the dignity-
rights of all. Abraham Lincoln reminded Congress of this in the early
years of the Civil War: "In giving freedom to the slave, we assure free-
dom to the free—honorable alike in what we give, and what we pre-
serve."558
 Illegitimate rights-holders, such as slave-owners, always suffer
when stripped of their illegitimate rights. The extension of dignity-
rights to chimpanzees and bonobos will have no greater impact upon
human rights than the destruction of human slavery had upon the
unjust rights of slave-owners, the regulation of child labor upon the
unjust rights of sweatshop proprietors, and the abolition of sexual
preferences upon the unjust rights of the hindered sex.
Correlatively, the dignity-rights of every human are undermined
by the inevitable subverting of fairness, liberty, equality, and judicial
integrity that occurs when dignity-rights are arbitrarily or invidiously
denied to anyone qualified to receive them.
F. Animal Rights and Religion
Professor Tribe argues that:
crusades to protect new values, or to attach old values to new
beings and new entities must take great care to avoid relig-
ious intolerance or antagonism. Here I tread on sensitive
ground, and I may have misread some things in Steve's book,
but at times arguing for animal rights appears to rest on a
condemnation of religion, at least of Western religion, as the
real culprit in helping people to rationalize self-serving sub-
ordination of the rest of the animal kingdom. True, religion
and its crusades have been guilty of many things. But I think
557
 Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 1975).
358 Abraham Lincoln, State of the Union Address (Dec. 1, 1862), in 5 COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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it a mistake to tie the protection of non-human animals so
tightly, to r anything, that might be understood as anti-
religious or anti-spiritual. Making that link can obviously al-
ienate scores of potential allies. And it seems to me basically
fallacious. 359
My arguments for the legal rights of chimpanzees and bonobos do
not rest on a condemnation of religion. Religion is nearly irrelevant.
Some religions, however, do rationalize the human subordination of
all the nonhuman world. It is hard to dispute that religion has ration-
alized many forms of subordination, including human rights in gen-
eral, human slavery, women's rights, abortion, and the environment.
Religion has often been indifferent, even hostile, toward human
rights. 360 The major Western religions, well-formed centuries before
human rights appeared, long ignored them. The Atlantic slave trade
was thoroughly dominated by Christians. Jews enslaved gentiles, Afri-
cans, and other Jews."' Islam, too, accepted slavery and its slave trade
may have equaled the Atlantic slave trade. 362 American slave support-
ers trumpeted God's imprimatur on slavery from Genesis to Pau1. 363
Baptist Minister Thornton Stringfellow argued the institution of slav-
ery had received "the sanction of the Almighty" and that the "control
of the black race, by the white, is an indispensable Christian duty."564
Even the American Civil War did not strangle the claims of some or-
thodox Jews and Christian biblical scholars that human slavery was
"an ordinance of God."365
Judeo-Christian theologians long articulated that women were to
be subjugated by men. 3" Gratian, the father of canon law, claimed
that only men were made in God's image. 367 Of the common law's
long subjugation of married women, one seventeenth century English
366
 Tribe, supra note 75, at 5.
36° HENKIN, supra note 336, at 183-88.
361 See DAVIS, supra note 81, at 82-101; ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL
DEATH-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 40-41,117 (1982).
362 PArrEasoN, supra note 361, at 117; RONALD SEGAL, ISLAM'S BLACK SLAVES-THE
OTHER BLACK DIASPORA 1-12 (2001); THOMAS, supra note 134, at 37-39; see DAVIS, supra
note 81, at 22.
S5/ See THOMAS, supra note 134, at 29-31.
364 THORNTON STRINGFELLOW, SCRIPTURAL AND STATISTICAL VIEWS IN FAVOR OF SLAV-
ERY 105 (1856); see Thornton Stringfellow, The Bible Argument, or, Slavery in the Light of Di-
vine Revelation, in CorroN IS KING AND PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENTS 462 (1860).
563 DAVIS, supra note 81, at 112.
160 E.g., NANCY TUANA, THE LESS NOBLE SEX-SCIENTIFIC, RELIGIOUS, AND PHILO-
SOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF WOMAN'S NATURE 10-14,157-59 (1993).
387 1 Gratian, Decretum, col. 1254.
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legal scholar thought "Nile common laws here shaketh hand with
divinitye."368 The struggle over abortion, says Ronald Dworkin, "has
often had the character of a conflict between religious sects. In the
United States, opinions about abortion correlate dramatically with
religious belief. . .. The anti-abortion movement is led by religious
groups, uses religious language, incessantly invokes God, and often
calls for prayer. "369
 Science historian Lynn White made one of the
most famous opening shots of the modern environmental movement
in 1967 when, in the pages of Science, he wrote that our ecological
problems come from "Christian attitudes toward man's relation to
nature," attitudes that we are "superior to nature, contemptuous of it,
willing to use it for our slightest whim."3"
Almost everything White, and those like him, say about Christian
rationalizations for despoiling the environment apply to Christian
views of nonhuman animals, who are often seen as part of the envi-
ronment. Recall Professor Sorabji's statement that the Stoic view of
animals became embedded in Western Christianity "above all through
Augustine."5" Professor Waldau notes that, "with regard to the status of
other animals," the subsequent Christian tradition "has been, with few
exceptions, a footnote to his views" and the views of similar-thinking
theologians.372 Augustine thought that
members of the human species alone . . . matter among the
earth's animals. This template is part of the inherently con-
servative feature of Christianity as it is bound to its scriptural
inheritance and its preoccupation with tradition. The result
is that the early refusal to take any other animals seriously
has become a central, even honored, feature of the tradi-
tion.'"
Augustine's ideas were heavily influenced, in turn, by the Genesis
verses in which God gave humans dominion over the rest of Creation,
3158
 ANONYMOUS, THE LAWES RESOLUTIONS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS: OR, THE LAWES PRO-
VISIONS FOR WOMEN 125 (1632); see ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE
WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (1996).
36° RONALD DWORKIN, Ltru's DOMINION-AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHENA-
SIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 35, 36 (1993).
37° Lynn White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCI. 1204, 1204 (1967);
see also RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE-A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS 88-96 (1989) (discussing White's essay).
371 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
371 WALDAU, supra note 127, at 200.
373 Id. at 200-01.
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with dominion usually understood as equivalent to domination. 374
Genesis and Augustine (and Aristotle for that matter) continue to
influence modern religious thought. In 2001, for example, the Vati-
can's Pontifical Academy for Life did not object to the use of nonhu-
man animal transplants in human beings. "[T] he academy argues that
because humans enjoy a unique and superior dignity, and God has
placed non-human creatures at the service of people, the sacrifice of
animals is justified as long as there will be a `relevant benefit for hu-
mans.'"375 In a letter to Nature, two members of the Vatican's
Pontifical Academy for Life wrote that "man has a right and duty to
act within and on the created order, making use of other creatures to
achieve the final goal of all creation: the glory of God through the
promotion of man. "376 The Catholic Catechism teaches that
.1
"[al nimals, like plants and inanimate beings, are by nature destined
for the common good of past, present, and future hurnanity." 377 Ac-
cording to Professor Waldau, speciesism does not characterize just
Roman Catholic doctrine; "mainline Christian tradition . . . has val-
ues, emphases, and exclusions that fit within the definition of specie-
sism used [by Professor Waldau] ." 378 Advocates did not allow the relig-
ious embrace of opposition to human rights in general, human
slavery, women's rights, abortion, and the environment to stop them.
III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
A. A Proposal for the Determination of Basic Liberty Rights
In Rattling the Cage, I argued that normal adult chimpanzees and
bonobos are entitled to the basic common law rights to bodily integ-
rity and bodily liberty. In my upcoming book Drawing the Line: Science
and The Case for Animal Rights, I examine the strength of the argu-
ments for these basic common law rights for normal adult gorillas,
orangutans, Atlantic bottlenosed,dolphins, African elephants, African
574 See generally id. at 189-96, 205-06.
• 375 Xavier Bosch, Vatican Approves Use of Animal Transplants to Benefit Humans,' 413 NA-
TURE 445, 445 (2001).
376 Archbishop Monsignor Elio Sgreccia et al., Church Backing Depends on Ethical Use of
Animals, 414 NATURE 687,687 (2001).
577 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH para. 2415 (2d ed. 1994).
578 WALDAU, supra note 127, at 216. The Judeo-Christian tradition does not stand
alone. Professor Waldau explores Buddhist attitudes toward nonhuman animals. While not
speciesist to the degree of the Christian tradition, the Buddhist traditon is also hierarchical
and accepts uses of nonhuman animals that harm them. Id. at 113-15.
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Grey parrots, dogs, and honeybees, assigning each an "autonomy .
value" between zero and one and setting up four categories.
When a range of behaviors in an evolutionary cousin closely re-
sembles ours, as do those in normal adult chimpanzees and bonobos,
we can confidently assign her a value of almost 1.00. I assign normal
adult chimpanzees and bonobos a value of 0.98 and place any animal
with an autonomy value of 0.90 or greater into Category One. These
animals clearly possess practical autonomy sufficient for basic liberty
rights. They are probably self-conscious and pass the mirror self-
recognition (MSR) test. The standard MSR test was developed by psy-
chologist Gordon Gallup, Jr. in the 1970s, working with chimpan-
zees.379 Gallup placed red marks on the heads of anesthetized chim-
panzees, then watched to see if they touched the marks when peering
into a mirror. He assumed if they did, they were self-aware."° Gallup's
MSR test, and variants adapted for other nonhuman species and hu-
man infants, are widely used as a marker for visual self-recognition,
though there is disagreement about what it signifies and whether fail-
ure means that self-awareness is lacking. Regardless, if they pass, they
should automatically be placed into Category One. These animals
may also have some or all of the elements of a theory of mind (they
know what others see or know), understand symbols, use a sophisti-
cated language or language-like communication system, deceive, pre-
tend, imitate, or solve complex problems.
Into Category Two, I place animals who fail MSR tests and who
may lack self-consciousness and every element of a theory of mind,
but possess a simpler consciousness, mentally represent and are able
to think, perhaps use a simple communication system, have a primi-
tive but sufficient sense of self, and are at least modestly evolutionarily
close to humans. They act insightfully, with insight sometimes used as
a synonym for thinking, as it allows a being to solve a problem
efficiently and safely by mentally "seeing" a solution without having to
engage in extensive trial and error."' Biologist Bernd Heinrich specu-
lates that consciousness, which he believes implies awareness through
mental visualization, developed "for one specific reason only To
3" Gordon G. Gallup, Jr., Chimpanzees: Sek-recognition, 167 Su. 86 (1970).
3m1 Id.
"1 See MICHAEL TOMASELLO & JOSEF CALL, PRIMATE COGNITION 68-69 (1997) (ex-
plaining how certain animals engage in symbolic play); Bernd Heinrich, Testing Insight in
Ravens, in THE EVOLUTION OF COGNITION 289, 300-01 (Cecilia Heyes & Ludwig Huber
eds., 2000); Sandra T. deBlois et al., Object Permanence in Orangutans (Pongo Pygmaeus) and
Squirrel Monkeys (Saimiri Sciureus), 112 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 137, 148 (1998).
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The strength of each animal's liberty rights claim will turn upon
that mental abilities she has and how certain we are she has them.
Category Two covers the immense cognitive ground of every animal
with an autonomy value between 0.51 and 0.89. Whether an animal
should be placed in the higher (0.80-0.89), middle (0.70-0.79), or
lower (0.51-0.69) reaches of Category Two depends upon whether
she uses symbols, conceptualizes (mentally represents), or demon-
strates other sophisticated mental abilities. Her taxonomic class
(mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, fish, insect) and the nearness of
her evolutionary relationship to humans (which are related) may also
be important factors.
I assign an autonomy value below 0.50 to taxonomically and evo-
lutionarily remote animals, whose behavior scarcely resembles ours
and who may lack all consciousness and be nothing but living stimu-
lus-response machines. The lower the value the more certain we can
be they utterly lack practical autonomy, though they may or may not
be eligible for equality rights. I place them all into Category Four. Fi-
nally, we do not know enough about many, perhaps most, nonhuman
animals reasonably to assign them any value either above or below
0.50. Perhaps we have never taken the time to learn about them or
our minds are not sufficiently penetrating to understand them. We
can assign them to Category Three.
I borrow the concept of the precautionary principle from envi-
ronmental law to analyze the entitlement of Category Two animals to
basic liberty rights. 583
 The precautionary principle has constituted a
"fundamental shift" in how environmental concerns are faced. 384 It
rejects science "as the absolute guide for the environmental policy
maker"385 and
embodies the notion that where there is uncertainty regard-
ing the potential impact of a substance or activity, "rather
than await certainty, regulators should act in anticipation of
environmental harm to ensure that this harm does not oc-
388
 BERND HEINRICH, THE MIND OF THE RAVEN— INVESTIGATIONS AND ADVENTURES
WITH WOLF—BIRDS 337 (1999).
383 Naomi Rolit-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening" of International Made
Lau, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LurG. 57, 60 (1992),
384 Id.
383 Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing
Caution, 4 GEO,	 ENVTL. L. REv. 303, 311 (1992).
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cur." Without such an approach, an activity or substance
might have an irreversible impact on the environment while
scientists determine its precise effect. 386
At the principle's core is the idea that non-negligible environmental
risks should be prevented, even in the face of scientific uncertainty.
If the precautionary principle is not applied, every Category Two
animal would be disqualified from liberty rights. An expansive appli-
cation of the precautionary principle would mean any animal with an
autonomy value above 0.50 should be granted rights. I propose an
intermediate reading: any animal with an autonomy value higher than
0.70 is presumed to have practical autonomy sufficient for basic lib-
erty rights. But how should an animal scoring higher than 0.50 but
less than 0.70 be treated? By definition, some evidence exists that they
possess practical autonomy. But it is weak, either because at least one
element is missing or the elements together are feebly supported.
More than one million animal species exist. While Darwinian
evolution postulates a natural continuum of mental abilities, the ani-
mal kingdom is incredibly diverse. At some taxonomic point, the ele-
ments of practical autonomy—self, intentions, desire, sentience, and
finally consciousness—begin to evaporate. We do not know precisely
where. I have stood on the summit of Cadillac Mountain on Mt. Des-
ert Island in Maine watching the summer sun rise. At four o'clock in
the morning, it was indisputably night; at seven o'clock, indisputably
day. When did night become day?
We could deal with this problem in one of two ways. Not using
the precautionary principle would allow a judge to draw a line, and an
animal beneath it would not be entitled to liberty rights. There is an-
other way, however, that is consistent with even a moderate reading of
the precautionary principle. Personhood and basic liberty rights
should be given in proportion to the degree that one has practical
autonomy. If you have it, you get rights in full. But if you do not, the
degree to which you approach it might make you eligible to receive
some proportion of liberty rights. 387
This idea of receiving proportional liberty rights accords with
how judges often think. They may give fewer legal rights to humans
3" Charmian Barton, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence in
Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 509, 513 (1998) (quot-
ing Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, 33 ENV'T 4, 4
(1991)).
sin ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 111, 121 (1978); WELLMAN, supra note 166,
at 129.
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who lack autonomy. But judges do not make them things. A severely
mentally limited human adult or child who lacks the mental where-
withal to participate in the political process may still move freely
about, though she may be accorded narrower legal rights. A severely
mentally limited human adult or child might not have the right to
move in the world at large, but may move freely within her home or
within an institution. She may be given parts of a complex right (re-
member, what we normally think of as a single legal right is actually a
bundle of them). A profoundly retarded human might have a claim to
bodily integrity, but lack the power to waive it, and be unable to con-
sent to a risky medical procedure or the withdrawal of life-saving
medical treatment. 388
Consistent with a moderate use of the precautionary principle,
we need not grant basic liberty rights to a nonhuman animal who has
just a shadow of practical autonomy; that is, we grant even animals
with an autonomy value of 0.51 some tiny right. But it would be con-
sistent with such a reading for an animal with an autonomy value of
0.65, perhaps even 0.60, to be given strong consideration for some
proportional basic liberty rights.
At some point, autonomy completely winks out and with it any
nonarbitrary entitlement to liberty rights on the ground of possessing
practical autonomy. Judges and legislators might decide to grant even
a completely nonautonomous being basic liberty rights. But it is hard
to think of grounds upon which they might do it non arbitrarily.
B. Human Yardsticks, Nonhuman Animals
Nature writer Henry Reston wrote that "the animal shall not be
measured by man. In a world older and more complete than ours they
move finished and complete, gifted with extensions of the senses we
have lost or never attained, living by voices we shall never hear." 389
The liberty rights to bodily integrity and bodily liberty, however, are
embedded in law precisely because they are basic to human well-
being, and the autonomy values we assign to nonhumans will be based
upon human abilities and human values. This argument bridges the
present, when law values only human-like abilities but must still con-
front the argument for liberty rights of nonhuman animals who have
them, and the future, when the law may value nonhuman abilities, as
588 WELLMAN, supra note 166, at 130-31.
389 HENRY BESTON, Tan OUTERMOST HOUSE 25 (1967).
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well. For the present, I accept that the law measures nonhuman ani-
mals with a human yardstick.
But just because law is so parochial, we must not think human
intelligence the only intelligence. Intelligence is a complicated con-
cept that intimately relates to an ability to solve problems.'" Professor
Heinrich writes, "[W]e can't credibly claim that one species is more
intelligent than another unless we specify intelligent with respect to what,
since each animal lives in a different world of its own sensory inputs
and decoding mechanisms of those inputs. "S91 Dolphin expert Diana
Reiss argues that intelligence cannot properly be conceived solely in
human terms392 and condemns any assumption that "only our kind of
intelligence is 'real intelligence.' "393 We must not think the human
self the only self or human abilities the only important mental abili-
ties.
In his famous essay, What is it Like to be a Bat?, philosopher Tho-
mas Nagel focused on bats, instead of flounders or wasps, because
they are mammals, and "if one travels too far down the phylogenetic
tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience there
at all."394 Even bats, he wrote, are "a fundamentally alien form of
life."'" How can we know when a nonhuman has practical autonomy?
In Rattling the Cage, I answered with "de Waal's Rule of Thumb:" in the
absence of strong contrary arguments, if closely-related species act the
same, it is likely, though not certain, they share the same mental pro-
cesses.'" Because chimpanzees and bonobos are evolutionary first
cousins with senses identical to ours, we can feel confident our basic
interests are similar. But the likelihood we will misunderstand or mis-
take these interests increases with evolutionary distance and differ-
593 STUART SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 211
(1989).
351 Heinrich, supra note 381, at 327.
392 Diana Reiss, The Dolphin: An Alien Intelligence, in FIRST CONTACT—THE SEARCH FOR
EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCE 31 (Ben Bova & Bryon Press eds., 1990).
395 Id. at 39.
394 Thomas Nagel, What is it Like to Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. REV. 435, 438 (1974), reprinted in
THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS—PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 519, 520 (Ned Block et al,
eds., 1997).
393 Id. at 520-21.
396 See DE WAAL, supra note 265, at 64-65 (1996); Frans de Waal, Foreword to ANTHRO-
POMORPHISM, ANECDOTES, AND ANIMALS, at xiii, xiv (Robert W. Mitchell et al. eds., 1997)
("[Ilf closely related species act the same, the underlying menial prim t'SM'S arr 0(111.1111v
the same, too."); Frans de Waal, The Chimpanzee's Seale of Soo ial Bekrutoon and hi itdassaa
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ences in ecology, information-processing capabilities, or the ways in
which we perceive or conceive of the world. Humans, for example,
can live happy solitary lives. But a single Atlantic bottlenosed dolphin
is scarcely a dolphin. Humans do not need to swim. But after seventy
generations of being factory farmed in cages, minks expend large
amounts of energy just for the opportunity to swim, and when they
cannot, their bodies produce high levels of cortisol, a "stress" hor-
mone similar to that produced when they are denied food. 397
Elephant researcher Joyce Poole asks us to imagine showing
drawings of human and elephant heads to an extraterrestria1. 398 It
would be reasonable to assume the creature with the huge ears and
nose has terrific hearing and smelling abilities, while the one with the
tiny nose and big eyes can see, but is unlikely to smell, well. 399 This
would be correct. Elephants hear sounds below the human thresh-
oicLoo Elephant nasal cavities contain seven of the turbinals special-
ized for odor detection. Poole concludes elephants, who also detect
hormones with a unique Jacobsen's organ, are so different from us
they live in another sensory world.401 More than forty years ago, psy-
chologist Harry Harlow, reviled today by many for his cruel depriva-
tion experiments on baby monkeys, wrote that "it is hazardous to
compare learning ability among animals independently of their sen-
sory and motor capacities and limitations." 402 Professor Harry Jerison
writes that "the nature of self is surely significantly different in differ-
ent species ..." but human intuitions about self "are so strong that it
is difficult to imagine a creature with information processing capacity
comparable to ours, equal to us in intelligence ... that has a differ-
ently constructed self." 403 But they exist and he gives dolphins as an
example. 404
The animals who fall into Categories Three and Four, and some
perhaps in Category Two, may not now be entitled to basic liberty
rights simply because we do not value their brand of intelligence,
"7 Georgia J. Mason et al., frustrations of Fur-Farmed Mink, 410 NATURE 35, 35-56
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404 Id. at 148-49.
696	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 43:623
their style of learning, their sense of self. But Category One animals
and at least some of those in Category Two measure up even to hu-
man standards. Chimpanzees and bonobos do. In Drawing the Line, I
review the evidence, make my own judgments about how certain prac-
tical autonomy exists, how strong a scientific argument has been
made, how valid the data is, and applying the spirit and letter of the
precautionary principle to uncertainties, then assign a fair autonomy
value to honeybees, my son Christopher, Christopher's dog, Marbury,
Echo the African elephant, Alex the African Grey parrot, Atlantic bot-
tlenosed dolphins Phoenix and Ake, Chantek an orangutan, and
Koko the gorilla. I find that all but honeybees and Marbury are enti-
tled to basic liberty rights now.
